NATO: A BUSINESS HISTORY Volume III of three by Robert R. Foxcurran 1986 revision
NATO: A BUSINESS HISTORY Volume El of three by Robert R. Foxcurran 1986 revision
This information is considered to be Competitive Sensitive by The Boeing Company. It has not been released for broader dissemination to industry. At this juncture it is available outside of Boeing for U.S. Government and NATO staff personnel only.
Disk # 196/Cover Sheet/R4/3
CHAPTER 10
MODE #5 - TRANSATLANTIC JOINT DEVELOPMENT
This Mode of industrial collaboration Is one that has encountered greater difficulty than any other Mode. Here we cover three failures; the MBT-70, AVS fighter. Mallard-tactical communication system; one partial abort, the NATO PHM; and two successes, the NATO Seasparrow and the CFM-56. These latter two projects suggests some guidelines as to where and how this Mode can work, and is also highly important for Mode #8 of industrial collaboration (the Family of Weapons concept) .
This Mode has faced serious problems in several areas. Chief among these are:
(1) The greater difficulty of coordinating the input of the users, and main- taining their support for a given requirement, especially on the U.S end .
(2) Balancing the overwhelming proportionate U.S. governmental and industrial share of such programs, with the preference of the larger European nations for collaboration on an equity basis.
(3) Establishing a politically acceptable yet effective chain of command within both the Industry and government teams.
(4) U.S. export restrictions .
Chapter 10 1-1
A. TWO SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN JOINT DEVELOPMENT HAS WORKED
Before going into the six projects, two related areas are treated briefly: lower level transatlantic cooperation in R & D and the U.S. -Canadian relation- ship.
1. Lower-level Transatlantic Cooperative R & D Projects
In contrast to the examples of transatlantic co-development of major systems there are a plethora of recent examples of lower-level transatlantic coopera- tive R & 0 projects, amongst which there has been a higher rate of positive results. Amongst these are two principal categories. First, there are those covering a broad range of basic research and exploratory development which are too numerous to enumerate.. Second, there are a small number of subsystems which have successfully completed engineering development. Implementation is either through the work being divided up between participants with each par- ticipating country funding its respective effort or by having the two or more participating nations collectively fund the work which is carried out unilat- erally in one nation.
a. Basic Research and Exploratory Development
An example of the U.S. cooperating in exploratory development was the U.S. Army-UK program on fuel cells. A fuel cell generates direct electrical cur- rent through the cold chemical reaction between oxygen and hydrogen. The objective of the work was to form a basis for developing efficient, advanced.
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Chapter 10 A-l
low-cost electrical power sources. The project took place between i960 and 1974 costing a bit over one million dollars and was one from which both parties benefited economically as well as technologically.^
The U.S. Navy set up a shallow-water acoustic basic research program in June,
1972, with the FRG and Netherlands. The program is concerned with gathering
basic hydroacoustic data, exploring environmental acoustics of the Baltic Sea,
and testing sound propagation in selected areas of the western Baltic Sea.
The program's objective is to expand the shallow-water research data bank of
2
the participants by capitalizing on each others research.
Another cooperative basic research project involved the U.S. Army and the FRG in studying the effects of transient radiation effects on electronics as relating to the Leopard tank. The work was carried out between 1971 and 1975 solely in the U.S.3
There are also a number of NATO associated coordinating group activities and technical centers, that contribute to technical information exchange and the initiation of cooperative efforts. These include, in addition to CNAD and its Service Armaments Groups and the Defense Research Group, the NATO Science Com- mittee, and the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD). These are examples of NATO coordinating bodies which continuously provide a
working mechanism for cooperation. The SHAPE Technical Center (STC) and the SACLANT ASW Research Center, are both jointly funded and staffed research activities, that support NATO military organizations in scientific and
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Chapter 10 A-2
4
technical matters. Then there is the Azores fixed acoustics range facility,
which is almost NATO-wide, being commonly funded by the U.S., UK, FRG, Nether-
5
lands, France, Italy, Canada and Portugal.
b. Engineering Development
Most of the cooperatively developed subsystems involving the U.S. that have successfully completed engineering development have involved Canada as the other partner. Here, however, we are concerned with the U.S. -European rela- tionship not the unique U.S. -Canadian one, which will be briefly treated, shortly.
Even though there has been historically a fairly high attrition rate among the transatlantic co-development programs there have been several that have com- pleted engineering development.6 One of these is the U.S.A.F. and the FRG cooperative (advanced and engineering) development of a side-looking airborne radar system. The initial program took place between 1968 and 1974 and cost some $24 million. The radar provides all-weather reconnaisance in three- dimensional picture-like presentation with greater aerial coverage.7
c. Two Funding Methods
The first of the two arrangements for funding and distributing work was used in the case of the U.S. - UK cooperation in fuel cells development and the U.S. -FRG -Netherlands shallow-water acoustic research program. For the fuel cells program the work was divided up between the U.S. and UK, with each
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Chapter 10 A-3
funding its own effort. The U.S. share of the costs came to 63% of the total. The shallow-water acoustic research program followed a similar arrangement.
In the case of both the side-looking airborne radar and the transient radia- tion effects on Leopard tank electronics programs all work was performed in the U.S. For the former program the cost was shared 50 - 50 since both nations had a requirement, but with the latter program the FRG provided for the total funding.
In both cases the FRG was basically just buying technology. This arrangement though does not necessarily depend on lack of capability on the part of one partner to perform its share of the work as is exemplified in the development of the Javelot forward air defense missile system project. The U.S. agreed to pay 50% of the development cost while all development work was in France. The project began in April 1971 with an estimated completion date of April, 1976,
o
and amounted to several million dollars.
2. The U.S. - Canadian Production Sharing Agreement (1963)
A special relationship exists between the U.S. and Canada that is unique among NATO relationships and provides for close cooperation in military research and development, as well as production. In 1963, the United States - Canadian Development Sharing Program was established as a natural followup to the U.S. -Canada Production Sharing Agreement of 1941, and the 1950 Joint Statement of Economic Cooperation. 9 More immediately, this Development-Sharing Program stems from a 1958 decision of the Canadian Government that it was no longer
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Chapter 10 A-4
practical to undertake unilateral development of major military systems for the meeting of Canadian military requirements. Since this meant that subse- quent procurement of major military systems would be from off-shore sources, primarily the U.S. , it was necessary to establish a framework that would allow for the maintenance of Canadian industrial and technical capability which could provide for offsetting sales. This led to the expansion of the U.S.- Canada production sharing to include development sharing as well.
Under the Development Sharing Program the U.S. pays for at least 25% of the cost of individual Canadian projects, but for the most part, cost sharing comes to around a 50 - 50 split. All work on these projects is done in Canada.
The stated objectives of the program are:
(1) To assist in maintaining the Defense Production Sharing Program at a high level by making it possible for Canadian firms to perform research and development work undertaken to meet the requirements of the U.S. Armed Forces.
(2) To better utilize the industrial, scientific and technical resources of the United States and Canada in the interest of mutual defense.
(3) To make possible the standardization and interchangeability of a larger amount of the equipment necessary for the defense of the United States and Canada.
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1 Comptroller General of the United States, Benefits and Drawbacks of U.S. Participation in Military Cooperative Research and Development Programs
with Allied Countries, 1974, pp. 11 and 37.
2 Ibid., p. 13
3 Ibid., p. 37
4 Ibid., p. 39
5 The Azores facility is for conducting fixed underwater voice communica- tions experiments.
The Navy wanted to develop data for such a communication system, using the most adverse conditions as a basis and thereby establishing the parameter within the system would have to operate. The Azores area had the environmental and geographical conditions most desired. As a result the Navy has gained access to an area that the United States might other wise have had to rent, or worse, have been denied access to.
6 Several such projects involving U.S. Mutual Weapons Development Program
(MWDP) funding are mentioned elsewhere in the paper.
7 Comptroller General, op. cit. , pp 10-11
8 Ibid., p. 19.
9 The 1950 Joint Statement of Economic Cooperation was closely related to the Canadian decision of the same year to surplus its older WWII British equipment and to re-equip its land forces with American equipment (covered in Chapter 5)
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B. The U.S.-FRG MAIN BATTLE TANK FOR THE 1970's (MBT - 70)
In October 1960, one of the NATO working groups emanating from the U.S. joint development initiatives, called the Twenty Projects, was convened on battle tanks. The U.S. government felt strongly at the time that transatlantic joint design and development projects were a natural and necessary expansion on the recently launched joint production programs. As we will shortly see however, where joint development was to be successful during the 1960's would be almost exclusively on an intra-European basis, not a transatlantic one. This was for a number of reasons; including: a shift in U.S. priorities because of the gold flow crisis and war in S.E.A.; and the need for Europe's 3 medium powers to collaborate in projects as coequals.
It quickly became clear to the NATO working group that any joint tank develop- ment effort would have to be oriented towards a production horizon of no sooner than ten years, since all of the other three major NATO countries— France, the FRG, and the UK— were all in the midst of their own tank develop- ment programs. The French and German projects were still in principle one joint project launched back in 1957, but one destined to result in the German Leopard I and the French AMX-30 (see Chapter 8).
Nevertheless, these talks eventually bore fruit in April 1962 in the form of a joint components agreement between the U.S. and the FRG, within the framework on the U.S. side of the Mutual Weapons Development Program (MWOP). Through the program, the components were aimed at providing a tank whose mutually agreed-on characteristics were close to those of an as yet unbudgeted U.S.
Chapter 10 B-l
successor to the M-60. Costs were to be shared and the program was to be administered by 2 national representatives meeting regularly as a Program Management Board.
Independently of the US-FRG joint development agreement reached at the level of the two army staffs, at the ministerial level a joint tank development project came to be seen as desirable to both parties. Secretary McNamara had pressed German Defense Minister Strauss in April 1961 on the subject of joint developments and particularly on the tank, whose development the U.S. badly needed. The Army had previously approved in 1959, a plan for development of a main battle tank to be available by 1964, but it had remained unbudgeted. In July at a NATO Defense Ministers meeting Strauss proposed, instead of a joint development project, that the U.S. adopt the forthcoming Leopard tank which would be available in 1965. As one might expect, this led nowhere. In any event, with the twin goals of strengthening NATO bonds and sharing the burdens of weapons development, McNamara maintained the pressure on the NATO allies for joint programs, and especially the most amenable (i.e. vulnerable) of them, the FRG. The official line of thought was shown in a memorandum to McNamara from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering in early 1962. It stated that "any funding (for a new MBT) after 1963 should be contingent on equal participation and support by two or more allies."^
1. The Intergovernmental Organization
On instructions from the two Ministries of Defense, negotiations began in Bonn in June 1962 with the U.S. proposing the MWDP agreement on components as a
Chapter 10 B-2
basis for the complete tank development. The following year, on August 1, 1963, U.S.
Secretary of Defense McNamara and German Defense Minister Kai-U • nn Hassel signed an MOU in which th U.S. and the FRG agreed to jointly develop a new main battle tank on a 50-50 basis. Key objectives therein were to design a type of tank embodying improved military characteristics that would be agreed upon by the two governments and to be ready for production by not later than 1970. The MOU also outlined additional objectives including the construction of eight prototypes in each country (or all 16 in one country if so agreed). Thus, after almost three years of concerted efforts (dating from the initia- tion of the Twenty Projects) began the U.S. Armed Forces' first major joint
2
development venture, for a system to be introduced into its own inventory.
On the heels of the MBT-70, the following year, another major US-FRG project, the AVS (V/STOL, fighter) was launched, as well as several purely European projects. It began to appear that both transatlantic and intra-European joint development efforts were picking up momentum. As we'll see though, most of the European projects survived while the first two transatlantic projects and the several that followed them, were to suffer a devastatingly high attrition ratio. ^
For starters, both the MBT-70 and the AVS projects were created in an era of financial plenty by the two nations defense ministers. In addition, all of the key personalities on the U.S. side who figured prominently in its birth were civilians. Besides the Secretary of Defense, this included the Deputy
Chapter 10
B-3
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army. In his 1975 study Richard Trainor brought out that * U.S. Army initially regarded the MBT-70 as not there own project, but more as a "gift from afar," and "did not appear to feel that they had total management responsibility for, or control of, the program until years later."4
Within a few days of the signing of the MOU each nation had appointed its Pro- gram Manager. The U.S. Program Manager was Brig, (later Maj.) Gen. W. G. Dolvin and the German Program Manager was Dr.-Ing. Fritz Englemann, a career civil servant and engineer. Both received the highest-level backing from their respective governments and immediately set out to gather their respec- tive staffs.
On October 9, 1963, the Program Management Board, exercising overall control of the program and retaining full responsibility and authority over all aspects of the program, held its first meeting in Bonn in an atmosphere described as one of "absolute parity." The two program managers planned to meet every two months and created a number of working groups. Principal among these were legal and finance, concepts, specifications and standards, and mil- itary requirements. An embryonic Joint Design Agency was also organized, but
5
staffing it was put off pending the outcome of the on-going discussions.
A major U.S. proposal at this first meeting was to undertake an operations research study in which leading potential design concepts from both countries would undergo computer simulated tactical wargaming that would assist the
Chapter 10 B-4
nations in concept selection. Known as the Parametric Design/Cost Effective- ness Study (PD/CE), this proposal quickly found favor with Dr. Engelmann.
Since no German firms were experienced in this area, it was agreed that a U.S. contractor would be selected.^
In order to insure the objectivity of the contractor selected for the one-year study contract, one that would provide input into design selection the con- tractor was to be barred from the actual development. Unfortunately though, as it turned out the firm selected in February 1964, Lockheed, had never designed or produced a tank or similar vehicle. Originally this was evidently not viewed as a serious drawback, but an advantage in that it didn't thin the ranks of the already limited number of potential U.S. competitors.
Based on a cost per pound using much less sophisticated tanks and estimating that a high performance tank could be built within a weight of 35 short tons, early cost estimates turned out to be well short of the mark.^
As the PMB continued to organize its work during the early meetings the 'abso- lute parity' developed into what became widely known as the 'einz fuer eniz' (sic) principle: one for one. That is, for every American, a German or vice versa at
every level. This was the common approach of the period, seen as well in several other concurrent joint development projects, such as the Concorde and the Jaguar. The U.S. Program Manager saw this as beneficial because it required close collaboration and communication between Germans and Americans
Chapter 10 B-5
across the board, up and down. In addition, the German Program Manager,
Engelmann, favorably compared this "togetherness" with the Franco-German
experiences in their joint program that finally collapsed in 1963 and resulted
in the Leopard I and AMX-30 tanks. "German engineers remained in Germany,
French engineers remained in France... The result...: two tanks, a German tank
8
and a French tank."
Whether or not 'einz fuer einz1 was the proper solution to the joint manage- ment problem, the phrase was destined to reverberate throughout all levels of
9
the organization, becoming the ' Leitidee, ' or central concept.
Early in the program an impasse was reached over whether to use metric of Anglo-Saxon units in designing the tank. One of the working groups estab- lished by the PMB was charged with the problem. Each side and in particular each industry marshalled all sorts of arguments. Under pressure from the var- ious industry associations and bureaucracies, neither the working group nor the PMB could reach a decision. Richard Trainor explained this inability to resolve the issue as having been caused by a feeling that the program was to establish a precedent for other major bilateral joint development programs. Both sides feared potential collateral damage to unspecified future programs, which tended to create rigidity in early negotiations at a time when flexibil- ity and trust were especially required. In accordance with the MOU the dis- pute was referred to the ministerial level. ^
The German Minister of Defense was also looking at the decision as a prece- dent, despite McNamara's desire to limit the problem to the MBT program. In
Chapter 10 B-6
May 1965 McNamara and von Hassel agreed that the Anglo-Saxon system would be used for U.S. developed components and metric for those developed in the FRG, but metric fasteners would be used at the interface between Anglo-Saxon and metric components. These negotiations were time consuming and delayed the beginning of detail design. ^
By the time of the second PMB meeting in December, it had become evident that a full-time joint government engineering agency was essential. Working groups meeting periodically could not provide the necessary day-to-day direction to Lockheed, to the component developers, or give appropriate and timely guidance to the key industrial participants after the contracts were awarded. As pointed out by Hochmuth in his study "Organizing the Transnational."
In the German contractual system, where the contractor had a rela- tively free hand and "led" the government, such a f 11 -time agency might not have been absolutely essential. But U.S. tank development procedures were based on close supervision and could not function without a supervising agency. 12
This agency, called the Joint Engineering Agency (JEA) was set up Augsburg, FRG, in September 1964. Its assigned mission was to provide technical direc- tion, control, and supervision of the program. Though Dolvin had intended to solve the issue of location by exchanging leadership for location, by force of personalities, the head of the German team became acting chief of the JEA, as
Chapter 10 B-7
2. Selection of the Industrial Team
In the matching up of government agencies and industrial partners, the MBT-70 program exemplifies a dilemna faced in many other transnational projects, as well. The following quote from Hochmuth 1 s Organizing the Transnational cap- tures this:
On the U S. side, the development of tanks had historically been the responsibility of the Ordnance Corps, which had a long tradition of "inhouse" capability based on the Army-run industrial arsenal sys- tem. This meant that there existed a reasonably competent and experienced staff of engineers and production technicians who would give detailed guidance and supervision to Ordnance contractors. The German tradition was to rely almost wholly on industry for leader- ship in development and production. Consequently Delvin' s staff envisioned an "Engineering Assistance Contractor" who would work hand in hand with a well-established group of government engineers. The Germans, on the other hand, had sought a financially and tech- nically competent firm with the management ability to run the
development. 14
But here the German Program Manager faced a problem. The FRG's reborn tank know-how was concentrated at Krauss-Maffei a major heavy machinery firm located in Munich and controlled by the Flick group that had developed the Leopard.
The German government, being unwilling to rely solely on Krauss-Maffei as a production source sought to use the MBT-70 to broaden its industrial base. Again quoting from Hochmuth:
Chapter 10 B-8
Here two characteristics of the German system came into play.
First, in Germany the engineering team that develops a product gen- erally stays on during production. This meant that any new contrac- tors would have to create a new engineering team, and there was a scarcity of good engineers. Second, a German development contractor who worked on a cost-reimburseabl e basis for the government was limited to a very small profit— 3 percent to 5 percent compared to about 10 percent for U.S. contractors. His real profit came from production royalties only if and when the government procured the product in quantity
A related and even more crucial difference was that under German law the engineer who designed a product or a component also had a pro- prietary interest in the production royalties and stood to gain a sizeable sum if his design was produced. This could have meant as much as a $60,000 bonus to a German designer in the MBT program. I5
Consequently the German government was worried that it couldn't build a strong enough industrial partner to work with U.S. industry on equal terms.
It was against this backdrop that the German Program Manager approached Harold Quandt. Quandt did not find the building of a consortium to be an easy task. However, by early 1964 he had lined up seven firms, among them Porsche, Daimler-Benz, Krauss-Maffei , and Rheinstahl most of which had been previously involved in the development of components and were likely candidates for inclusion in the MBT program. The Deutsche Entwicklungsgesel Ischaft (DEG) was incorporated in July, 1964.^
In the U.S. the program management office requested bids from U.S. companies in March, 1964 and General Motors was selected over Chrysler and Ford Machinery— Aeroneutronics. One of the considerations working in GM's favor, at least vis-a-vis Chrysler, was its multinational character. It was felt that its OPEL interests in the FRG would give them negotiating leverage with any prospective German partners. On this point however, Hochmuth was doubtful as
Chapter 10 B-9
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to whether these officials were aware of a long-held GM policy against enter- ing joint ventures within the U.S. or abroad.
In bidding, GM had allowed for a considerable systems management effort. But since their bid substantially exceeded the funds available and planned, the systems-management portion was deleted placing GM in the role of an assistant. Managerial responsibility remained with the government engineers on the U.S. program manager's staff.
GM's initial task under the contract was to perform a 6-month study effort, together with the selected German contractor, preparing a plan for active development. Immediately after the signing of the contract GM engineers were off to the FRG to start discussions with their newly formed counterpart, DEG, and German government officials.
But DEG did not yet have a contract. Principally due to the employees' pro- prietary rights issue, it was not to get one until November. The German gov- ernment had agreed to furnish these royalty-free to the U.S. government, but the problems arising from the German remuneration system were not easily over- come. There was very hard bargaining. This dilemma was at the root of a damaging incident later in September.
3. The Inter-governmental JEA and the Inter-industrial JDT Are Set Up in
Augsburg
After discussion at length over how to organize the joint industrial effort at
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the March 1964 meeting of the PMB, it was decided that it would be better if the firms selected worked it out for themselves. It had been agreed however, that whatever concept was selected, the JEA and the joint industry team should be collocated.
So it remained for the two contractors to decide on the industrial structure. Hochmuth described the efforts expended towards this end as follows:
In July 1964 Quandt had made a proposal to the FRG which called for a jointly staffed full-time engineering group supervised by a bilateral board of directors from the two prime national companies. But DEG and GM were a long way from a meeting of minds. Therefore, as soon as agreement was reached on the JEA, the program managers drafted instructions to the two contractors directing them to set up an interim Joint Design Team (JDT) to be collocated with the JEA. Presumably this could be altered when the industries reached agree- ment. In an effort to reach such an agreement representatives of GM and DEG had a month-long meeting in Essen, beginning August 14.
This meeting then moved to Detroit. The DEG negotiators, led by Quandt resisted GM and U.S. efforts to create a large JDT. Later they countered with proposals which would have reduced the role and importance of the JEA, a situation more akin to normal German prac- tice. GM's contract with the United States did not give them total system responsibility, and since GM was still actively seeking addi- tional defense work, they would not agree to any moves which might endanger their relations with the Army. Whatever the factors, little came of the meeting. There was no powerful joint agency, not even a "lead" contractor. The two companies simply agreed to staff the JDT jointly and established basic work procedures.
In September, 1964 the team of government engineers lead by a Gene Trapp and another team of 15 GM engineers headed by Clarence Crockett arrived in Augsburg, as the U.S. halves of the interim governmental JEA and the interim industrial JDT. Trapp and his German counterpart Hellwig felt that the JEA, with the assistance of the JDT would need some six months to work up a concept
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and do enough engineering to enable them to return home and carry out the work.
Hellwig and Trapp reportedly got along well together, and in part because Hellwig was clearly senior, he became acting chief of the interim JEA. The 'einz fuer einz' philosophy was rigidly adhered to from the beginning, unanim- ity being required for all decisions. Hellwig' s strong personality however, reportedly gave him a great, perhaps decisive, influence over the agency.
In the JEA the two sides seemed to function well together, although the Ameri- can engineers were in general more technically experienced than their counter- parts. In the JDT however, the situation was not as bright. Engineers were scarce in Germany, good ones being even scarcer. The DEG companies found it difficult to convince people to move to Augsburg. Those that went kept
returning to their firms to keep their bosses informed, to get instructions,
18
and "to be seen". After all, that's where their salaries came from.
Another problem impinging of the JDT's functioning was the negative repercus- sions emanating from the previously referred to issue over employee's proprie- tary rights between German government and industry which occurred as the teams installed themselves in the new office space. As furniture was being moved into space allocated to the JDT, workmen arrived and erected a partition the length of the hall. GM was informed that until the German government signed a contract with DEG affording suitable financial protection for the proprietary rights of the DEG firms and their engineers, the wall would stay up and designs would be closely held. Technical discussions were at arms length and guarded. The Americans were shocked, as was Hellwig. The German government
Chapter 10 B-12
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/B9-B27
only succeeded in getting the wall down in late November after the necessary
agreement was finally signed. But the damage was done and a greater than
19
necessary psychological barrier continued to exist.
4, Selecting a Design Concept
Though Hell wig had influence, he was not able to convince the United States to
give up or modify those requirements he felt were wrong. The Americans felt
that he was pressing the case of the German firms rather than championing his
own ideas. But this was inherent in German government's approach to defense
contracting. Had there been 1 governental boss at the top, Hellwig could have
asserted his influence. But with two program managers— each with his own
20
industry to look out for— it was not possible.
GM brought as their contending concepts the ideas around which they had written their proposal to the United States. What they faced on the other side were four different concepts each vigorously pushed by the German propo- nent firms. As a result there were four members of DEG disagreeing and fight- ing between themselves. Moreover, the German JEA couldn't force a compromise
21
German proposal— too much was at stake for the firms.
The program managers were helpless to make a decision without a recommendation from the JEA. After several months, it became apparent that there was no hope of completing a preliminary design in the 5 or 6 months originally planned.
Each firm continued to defend its own designs. Those German firms with can- didate components resorted to active "horsetrading". In addition, it was dif-
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Chapter 10 B— 13
ficult to get details of the German designs for objective analysis because of
22
the secretiveness of the DEG engineers.
In December the preliminary results of a parametric design study became avail- able, and showed that two similar concepts, a German and an American one, were the most cost-effective. The PMB instructed the JEA to combine the best fea- tures of the two concepts that showed up well in a parametric design/cost- effectiveness study. But, 'What were the best features of both?' 'Who would decide?'23
Trapp convinced Hell wig on a compromise concept with the driver in the turret in order to lower the silhouette. The JEA then forced design acceptance by the JDT, but only after agreement at the PMB level to divert joint funds to further develop some alternative German components proposed by DEG.
The JEA recommended a concept, which after approval by the PMB in March, led ultimately to an optimistic public announcement by McNamara and von Hassel.
When McNamara and von Hassel ‘met in May 1965 and confirmed the concept deci- sion, a news release after the meeting stated:
The German Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense announced today that the MBT-70 program has progressed to the point that a single design concept was agreed upon last week to meet the objectives of a quantum improvement in tank fire power, mobility, and protection... In the light of excellent progress the two minis- tries are developing presentations on the tank concept and future developments-production timing for those NATO countries having an interest in the MBT-70. 24
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Chapter 10 B-14
The design concept had been chosen, but not the components.
"As long as the competing components could be differentiated on the basis of nearness to completion, a choice could be achieved. But when a selection had to be made on the basis of judgment, experi- ence, basic philosophy, or other subjective criteria under the pres- sure of heavy national interest, no choice was made, and parallel development was agreed on."25
Trainor cited differences in the two nation's approaches to testing as another contributing cause to the loss of a considerable amount of time early in the program. Since the U.S. concentrates more on extensive component testing, while German policy gives greater emphasis to system-level testing, much time
pg
was consumed negotiating design changes and procedures for their validation.
At the same time that component selections were made, design responsibility, previously centered in the JDT, was divided up. It had been originally expected that the tank would be developed in the JDT, but by mid-1965 develop- ment responsibility had been shifted to industry on a component basis. This
left the JDT with responsibility for the design of the outer hull and turret
27
and the bookkeeping task of maintaining the master drawings.
"With the... optimistic public announcement of concept selection those government officials not directly involved in the day-to-day activities could assume that all was well. But behind the facade the internal tensions had already weakened the seams holding the program together."28
It having taken 15 months to hammer out a design concept instead of the five planned, in May 1965 Dolvin had to request additional funds.
"Costs had risen not only because of delays, but also because the cost-effectiveness study had not been included in the original estimate. Neither had provision been made for the extensive compe- titive studies and subsequent parallel developments. The PMB raised
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the total cost estimate to $138 million in August 1965 but did not change the overall schedule. ^
5. Other Joint-Design Problems
"DEG, GM, and the components developers, now officially freed from "control" of the JDT, began all-out efforts to win the parallel development competition and assert the superiority of their designs. Agreements that GM thought it had made with DEG were constantly brought up for revision. GM engineers accused the Germans of bad faith, and the Germans accused GM of servility to the U.S. govern- ment engineers. "30
Hochmuth quoted Dolvin on a fundamental problem.
"The decision-making process was diluted by shared authority and shared responsibility at all levels... There can only be negotiated decisions... This necessitates "compromise" and compromise leaves the door ajar to all sorts of national external pressures and pre- judices... ."31
Though Trainor found it difficult to ascribe any specific item of sophistica- tion to the joint features of the program, he did feel that these compromises tended to lead to designs that would appease both design groups, the result being greater complexity. In addition, he felt that the 50-50 sharing of
development cost contributed to some designers paying less attention to con-
32
cerns with regards to systems sophistication.
During 1965 the dissension-torn JDT finally gave way to fragmented responsi- bility between the JDT, DEG and its member firms, and GM. In addition, on the governmental side, after Hellwig left, the bureaucracy at the BWB gradually began to reassert its authority over the German JEA, and this bureaucracy felt little responsibility towards the joint program. But the most critical
Chapter 10 B-16
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/B9-B27
changes took place among the systems' users. Germans put a far lower priority on protection compared to mobility than did their U.S. allies. As the tank became heavier and heavier with each component compromise, resistance in the FRG grew.33
Yet another design problem can be traced to the attitude changes in the FRG that accompanied its resurgence within NATO. Although there had been no change in the basic tenets of German foreign policy ( i . e . , heavy reliance on NATO and maintenance of strong ties with the U.S.), during the early 60' s: the status of the FRG in NATO had strengthened, and as this occurred, the dif- fidence and reserve which characterized the FRG several years earlier began to
give way to a more independent and assertive attitude typical of the other
34
major NATO member states."
The German tank of WWII was clearly superior to counterpart American designs. In a similar vein, the German army has been justifiably proud of their knowledge of tank warfare, since the days of Guderian and Rommel. The Germans had a different view from the Americans as to what constituted the ideal tank. For example in the selection of a gun system neither side would compromise and the result was an agreement that each country would produce the tank with its own firepower system. The selection of the fire power system clearly had substantial influence on other aspects of the design. 35
By 1965, the development and production cost estimates had begun to grow both due to the substantial weight growth and a growing realization that the MBT-70 was much more complex on a per pound basis than contemporary tanks. By the time of its cancellation, the MBT-70 prototypes were to weigh over 55 tons.
To further exacerbate these already serious problems there was a gradual
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recognition that the planned production quantities and production rates were incompatible with shrinking Army budgets and programs.
On both sides the officers who had reached the initial agreements were now being transferred. As new people were brought in, a questioning of all previ- ous decisions at all levels arose causing considerable problems for the pro- gram as a whole.
To quote Trainor another problem was introduced by the fact that...
The two countries were producing tanks that were enjoying extensive foreign sales while there was no solid evidence of Soviet advances in tank technology that would force an extremely high schedule pri- ority on the MBT-70 program. Consequently, there was a tendency for the two countries to attempt to redesign the system more than would have been the case if there had been a higher priority on system deployment. 36
Consequently, Krauss-Maffei saw the MBT-70 was going nowhere at about the same time the first Leopard I tank rolled off the production line in late 1965.
With strong allied interest in the Leopard I surfacing, Krauss-Maffei started taking ideas from the MBT-70, and began thinking of a Leopard II.
On the government side both the German officers and the civilian officials began to wonder why they had ever agreed to a 1970 date for the replacement. The Leopard was good until 1974 at least, and probably well beyond,^7
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6. Development and Production of the Pilot Tanks and the Collapse of the
Program (1966-1970)
By the end of 1965 program slippage had yet to be recognized.
By June 1966 the JDT announced that the design effort for the first pilots was complete, and the move to Detroit began and was completed by September.
Though its responsibilities were reduced, the JDT was still to be responsible for keeping track of the overall design.
In June 1966 Dr. Englemann was replaced as program manager by Brig. Gen. Dr. -Ing. H. Schoenefeld. Gen. Dolvin was routinely reassigned in November and replaced by Major Gen. E. Burba, a distinguished armor officer but one evi- dently with no experience in research, development, production, or 38
procurement.
The agreed-on estimated cost rose from $130 million to $200 million by late 1966. Simultaneously, the delivery of the first pilots was postponed to July 1967 and the first production to December 1970— a year later than originally planned.^
In July, the first pilot tank was delivered by GM; and in September DEG turned one out. But, they were bare. The fire control system, the loader, and a host of components were missing, the designs only being 85 percent complete.
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Chapter 10 8-19
As a vehicle the tank performed superbly. Despite its weight and size it had amazing agility and speed.
"All who observed it were impressed. But, resistance to the increased costs was growing in both countries. The German users were losing interest, unhappy about the weight and other compromise characteristics, and above all unhappy about the estimated produc- tion costs. Meanwhile the Leopard continued to gain favor in Germany and abroad."40
The program suffered a severe blow in 1967 when Harold Quandt met an untimely death in a plane crash later in September. Hellwig had termed Quandt the "soul" of the DEG*
As the pilot tanks were put through their paces, the inevitable problems showed up.
"Each side took comfort in the problems of the other... Each vigor- ously sought to make sure the other side's components rigidly lived up to the specifications and pressed the development of its own backup components where they existed."4^-
The weight of the tank was now about four tons over the agreed limit. The United States maintained this was acceptable, but the Germans insisted on reducing the weight, i.e., a major redesign. The FRG Program Manager felt that continued progress was very seriously endangered. Unable to agree, the two program managers referred the matter to the ministerial level.
The Assistant Secretary of the Army and his German counterpart would not admit failure and decided to continue the program. After intensive exploration of the technical and financial alternatives, they agreed on:
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a) A single tank, weighing just slightly more than the previous maximum.
b) Slipping the first production date to 1973.
c) Increasing the joint costs to $303 million with $165 million of that
shared, not 50-50, but in proportion to the tanks produced by each 42
country.
To meet the weight requirement, the radiological armor was reportedly deleted from the design. Thus a fundamental requirement of the original concept had been sacrificed, representing a political decision imposed from the top. From the German military viewpoint, the principal reason for making a tank heavier than the Leopard was to have radiation-resistant armor.
Poorly served by a structure which could not satisfy either party and which paralyzed both so that the resources could not be con- trolled or marshalled to meet either of the natural goals, the pro- gram was failing. In September 1969, Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, alarmed by the estimated procurement costs of the tank after development, asked for a thorough review of the program. One outcome of this study was an estimate that the cost to comple- tion would be $524 mi 11 i on. 43
On January 20, 1970, a few days after the date originally planned for the first production tank to roll off the assembly lines, a press release from the Department of Defense signaled the end of the joint venture, announcing:
...The Army will reorient its Main Battle Tank development pro- gram... The modified bi national program involves some revision of the joint development relationship through which the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany have worked on the tank since 1963.
Each country will now assume unilateral technical decisions and uni- lateral funding...44
Whereupon the FRG shifted its development efforts over to a Leopard II design.
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The Leopard II, far less complex than the MBT-70, was developed drawing heavily developments generated in the joint program. The U.S., on the other hand, elected to continue unilateral development of an austere variant of the MBT-70. This lasted for almost 2 more years, at which time it was terminated under the fire of Congressional claims that this austere variant of the MBT-70 was overly sophisticated and unnecessarily complex.*
Viewed in retrospect, most of the problems of the MBT-70 program were not uniquely related to the bilateral development features of the program, most of its problems were exacerbated by joint development
For example, the 1974 GAO study entitled. Benefits and Drawbacks of U.S. par- ticipation in Military Cooperative Research and Development programs with allied countries, singled out one such point of exacerabation, the difficulty of harmonizing differences in military equipment requirements; as being one of the MBT-70 's major stumbling blocks. Continuing, it summarized as to how attempts at harmonization led to ever greater complexity and finally U.S. withdrawal .
In the case of the main battle tank (MBT-70) program, .. .harmonizing was a problem before and after the program started. . .the cooperative agreement pro- vided for a degree of commonality with each country having a different ver- sion, the U.S. version being more sophisticated. As development proceeded, several amendments were made to the cooperative agreement, each change result- ing in less commonality. Finally, the United States pulled out of the cooperative program.
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Chapter 10 B-22
As important as this problem was though, the fundamental weakness lay else- where*
7. Hoehmuth's Conclusions on Structure and Strategy
Had there been one master strategist charged with the successful implementation of the MB T~ 70 program at the outset, what might he have done?46
The ideal director would have understood that the specific goal of developing a tank had antecedent higher-level goals that were disparate, and he would have made certain that his actions rein- forced his power by increasing the congruity of his objective with the higher-level goals* The United States wanted and needed a tank by 1970, but Germany really didn't. The decision, the impetus, reflected U.S. needs, U.S. desires to economize, U.S. desires to strengthen NATO. ...It was not the decision of entrepreneurial leadership or some other goal-setting process based on calculation. It was based purely on aspiration. ...The U.S. legal expert who was termed the ‘architect1 of the original agreement by the top German negotiator, had been involved in several co-production programs, including the HAWK, but always apparently as a drafter of agree- ments, never as an observer of how they really operated. The Germans were following the U.S. lead in such matters at that time. ...Germany acquiesced for political reasons and a desire to get new technology, particularly in the fire control and radiological areas, although the Leopard was meeting her tank requirements for the 1985- 75 period.46
But there was no one master strategist. There were two program man- agers with separate resources and separate pressures to worry about. Because they had to seek consensus, and because the very nature of their formal responsibilities required them to protect the interests of their separate institutions, they could not reach a decision a concept (sic). They abdicated in favor of a computer. The computer supposedly would provide a 'rational', neutral, and objective deci- sion which each program manager could use to justify the concept selected to his own people. From the beginning, by inadvertent design, the strategic arena was not that of a single management shared by two mutually reinforcing individuals. Rather the program became two arenas in which two strategies were played out in such a way as to hinder each other.47
There was still hope when the JEA was formed that an integrated team could effect a program-wide strategy. But though the Americans and Germans sat in the same offices, it was abundantly clear that their bosses were their national bosses.4®
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Chapter 10 B-23
<
Prisoners of their national interests, the dual program managers were helpless to intervene effectively when the firms began to maneuver to get their individual concepts and their components selected.49
If DEG had been a solid cohesive firm with a reputation and goodwill to protect, there might still have been a chance to work something out with GM. Or, if GM had been given systems management responsi- bility, the firm might have forced a workable arrangement.50
The JEA, lacking a chief, became a combined gentlemen's boxing ring and information exchange.
The contractors were given separate contracts with different incen- tives and even different fee schedules for similar work. 52
There remained the JDT as a possible strategic catalyst. After July 1965 when the concept had been chosen and the components allocated, the JDT could have provided strategic direction. But again the mem- bers all were paid by their companies and would have to go back one day. The mutually agreed work assignment gave to the JDT responsi- bility for systems type problems including design proposals and to the prime and subcontractors the responsibility for accomplishment. This required that the JDT be given systems management and therefore the authority to direct the contractors. But the JDT was divorced from contractual, accounting, and payment functions; and lacking these normal business tools had to rely on the good will of both prime contractors to accept its direction...53
There was no strategy. The structure of the program guaranteed that there could not be.54
4
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Chapter 10 B-24
1 Milton S. Hochmuth, Organizing the Transnational: Experience in Trans- national Enterprise, A.W. Si jthoff , Leiden, the Netherlands, 1974, pp. 103-4.
2 Ibid., p. 99.
3 Richard J. Trainer, Barriers to the Transfer ot Systems Technology to the United States, Director of Systems Review and Analysis office. Head- quarters, Dept, of the Army, 1975, p. 3.
4 Hochmuth pointed out that there were two important differences in this otherwise analagous set of events. One, whereas with the signing of the MOU, the U.S. negotiators from Paris who had spent months drafting it faded completely out of the picture, in the FRG there was less disconti- nuity between the negotiating team and the officials charged with imple- mentation. In addition, the U.S. representatives involved in the 1962 to 1963 negotiations leading up to the MOU were mostly from the U.S. dele- gation to NATO, there being no evidence that any experts from U.S. agencies that would be charged with execution of the program or be the ultimate users were present. Secondly, while the project manager concept had become common place in the U.S., this was not the case in the FRG where the move was greeted with little enthusiasm at BWB (Hochmuth, op. cit. , p. 105-7).
5 Hochmuth, op. cot., p. 108.
6 Ibid.
7 Trainor cited this selection of an inexperienced contractor for these studies as a contributing factor to the inaccuracy of the early cost and weight estimates of 1963 and 1964 (Trainor, op. cit., p. 3).
8 Hochmuth, op. cit., p. 108.
9 Ibid., p. 108
10 Trainor, op. cit., p. 3.
11 Ibid., p. 4.
12 Hochmuth, op. cit., p. 112.
13 Ibid., pp. 113-4.
14 Ibid., p. 109.
15 Ibid, p. 109. NATO published a study in 1976 prepared by AC/94 Working Group on Industrial Property, entitled, "Regulations in NATO Countries Concerning Employee Inventions."
16 Hochmuth, op. cit., p. 109.
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Chapter 10 B-25
17 Hochmuth op. cit., pp. 113-114.
18 Ibid., p. 115.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 116.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 117.
24 Quoted from Hochmuth p. 101
25 Hochmuth p. 117, quoting Gabbe
26 Trainor, op. cit., p. 4
27 Hochmuth p. 118
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid p. 119
30 Ibid., p. 118
31 Ibid., pp. 118-9
32 Trainor, op. cit., p. 3.
33 Hochmuth, op. cit., p. 119.
34 Ibid., p. 102.
35 Trainor, op. cit., pp. 3-4
36 Ibid., p. 4.
37 To reinforce this point, in 1978 Canada selected the Leopard I for its
forces in central Europe.
38 Hochmuth, op. cit., p. 120.
39 Ibid., p. 121.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
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Chapter 10 B-26
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
Ibid., p. 122.
Ibid., pp. 122-3.
Comptroller General, op. cit..
Hochmuth, op. cit., p. 123 Ibid., pp. 123-4 Ibid., p. 124 Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
p. 22.
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/B9-B27
Chapter 10 B-27
C. A VS (U.S.-FRG V/STOL FIGHTER PROGRAM)
1. Background
In 1961, the NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR) #3 project was initiated as an attempt to find an alliance-wide solution to a common requirement for a VTOL light strike reconnaissance aircraft for the NATO Air Forces. In January 1962, NBMR 3 ended in an impasse after which each competing nation pursued its national project(s) on its own.^ The French continued with their VTOL Mirage II, ^ the British with their VTOL Hawker P-1127 (which eventually evolved into the Hawker Siddelley AV-8A Harrier and later the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier), and finally the U.S. and FRG with their respective efforts which will be covered shortly.
2. Organization
Unlike the purely unilateral approach of France and Britain, the U.S. and the FRG decided to establish a working group to study the feasibility of combining their separate V/STOL fighter aircraft projects into one joint development project. This was part of the wider effort to launch joint development projects that would pick up where the existing joint production projects were about to leave off. (The American-German MBT-70 was the other major trans- atlantic project emenating from this effort. All the successful ones, how- ever, were to exclude the U.S.) The study group recommended that the program be undertaken jointly and consist of three distinct phases: Conceptual; Pro- totype Definition; and Acquisition. At the conclusion of each phase a new
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/C1-C16
Chapter 10 C-l
joint agreement would be signed prior to proceeding to the next phase. The first phase commenced subsequent to MOU's dated August 1, 1963 and February 5, 1965, In addition, there was an International Agreement on Cooperation in R&D for V/5T0L aircraft signed on November 14, 1964.
Within the NATO Armament Committee (replaced by CHAD in 1966), the U.S. and FRG's Senior National Representative (SNR) coordinated policy for the project. Under them came a joint study group, and later, one for joint evaluation.
Development costs were to be shared on a 50 - 50 basis, but work sharing was
expected to be somewhere around a 60 - 40 ratio in consideration of the U.S.-
FRG troop offset arrangements. The two nations agreed that English would be
the official language for the program and the Anglo-Saxon system of weights
3
and measurements would be used.
The ultimate weapon system was to be a V/STOL tactical fighter aircraft with the following capabilities:
(1) All-weather, low-level, high-speed penetration, for delivery of either nuclear or non-nuclear ordnance at medium ranges.
(2) Air-to-ground strikes in support of ground combat operations at short range,
(3) All-weather, low-level, high-speed penetration reconnaissance and/or strike reconnaissance at medium to long ranges.
(4) Air-to-air combat of a self-defensive nature.4
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Chapter 10 C-2
The engines for the fighter were covered in an independent parallel program involving the joint funding by the U.K. and the U.S. of the Pegasus engine (later to power the Harrier). The Rolls-Royce/Bristol Siddeley Pegasus was a vectored-thrust vertical-lift engine and had represented a breakthrough in turbojet engine design.
The Pegasus engine dates back to 1957 when the U.S. , through its Mutual Wea- pons Development Program (MWDP), provided funding to Britain's Bristol Siddeley corporation for its development. One estimate put the U.S. contribu- tion through 1965 at $26 million or 56% of the total development cost. On
October 20, 1965, the U.S. and U.K. signed an MOU for the development of a
5
direct lift engine for V/STOL aircraft. The U.S. contracted with the Allison Division of General Motors and the U.K. contracted with Rolls-Royce.
A joint Project Board and an Industrial Program Manager for the vertical lift engine provided support to the U.S./FRG V/STOL project.^
In addition, two other U.S. contractors, Pratt & Whitney and General Electric, were both engaged in a contract definition competition for a lift-cruise
engine that would be applicable either for the AVS project or the USAF's FX
and the USN's VFAX projects.^
3. Design Study Program
There were two German contractors, and eventually two U.S. contractors, sub- mitting proposals during the Design Study phase. Each country was to hold its own source selection with the understanding that its selectee must be able to
k
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Chapter 10 C-3
8
work with any one of the contractors from the other country. Subsequently, the joint evaluation group was to select the best design characteristics from any or all proposals submitted and come up with a single configuration.
Whereas VIOL activity died down in the U.S. after the NBMR 3 impasse in January 1962, the German aerospace industry (along with the British and French) had continued its. national programs.
The two firms selected by the German Defense Procurement Agency, The Bundesamt fuer Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung (BWB), were VFW GmbH and Entwicklungring Sued (EWR) GmbH. Both EWR and VFW were brought under contract in late 1963. Messerschmitt had previously developed and flown its VTOL VJ-101 prototype, and VFW its VAK-91 prototype. EWR, a jointly owned subsidiary of Messerschmitt, Boelkow and Siebelwerke took over the VJ-101 from Messerschmitt in 1964. 9
EWR had a staff of about 250 working on the AVS alone, with an additional but smaller staff supporting F-104G reliability and maintainability efforts. Most of the AVS staff was to later reappear in the MRCA Tornado project, providing the core personnel. Representative of this, EWR1 s AVS Program Manager was Gero Madelung, later the MRCA ' s third Program Manager, and AVS Deputy Program Manager was Helmut Langfelder, the MRCA1 s second Program Manager.*0
In the fall of 1964, Boeing was given the first of three subcontracts by EWR to provide technical support. Manning levels for the Boeing team in Munich working with EWR started out at seven people in October 1964, and increased to
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Chapter 10 C-4
14 the following month with the signing of the intergovernmental MOU. In January 1965 Boeing received its second subcontract and its Munich detachment stabilized at approximately 40 people between May 1965 and January 1967. EWR, for its part, had a small team averaging around a half dozen men in Seattle during this period.^
The rationale behind the teaming up of the two firms was relatively simple. Both firms could see the NATO-wide VTOL interest in fighters. On EWR's side, Boeing, as one of the world's leaders in aerospace and as one third owner of Boelkow, was a logical choice for a partner for its first post-war fighter design effort. Boeing for its part, was interested in getting back into the fighter business (the last Boeing fighter to enter series production dated from the 1930's).^2
As the U.S. side of the project came on stream later than that of the FRG, Republic-Fairchild entered the picture in early 1966.
Reflecting a similar but looser teaming relationship between the other two firms, Republic-Fairchild sent a team to VFW (Bremen) in early 1966, be it a smaller one than the Boeing team. VFW also sent a small group over to Republic-Fairchild in the U.S.
The tight EWR-Boeing collaboration not surprisingly led to considerable cross- fertilization, so that in the end, among the four designs presented in late 1966, the EWR and Boeing designs were virtually identical. The U.S.A.F. took exception to this and at the last minute Boeing was required to revise its
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/C1-C16
Chapter 10 C-5
proposed design. In the end the EWR design was judged by the two Air Forces
13
to have been the best of the four.
Although this would eventually present the U.S.A.F. with a dilemma, it was cognizant of the close EWR-Boeing relationship throughout, and even encouraged it. Moreover, the USAF SPO requested both U.S. contractors submit, as an element in their proposals, their teaming arrangements. Republ ic-Fairchild had taken another tact than that of Boeing's, however. Feeling this repre- sented an endorsement of collusion that threatened to bias the competition, they let it be known they would protest on these grounds if the Boeing design was selected. The Source Selection Evaluation Board had trouble dealing with this rather ticklish issue, and opted not to score this part of the proposal,
only noting it. Thus Boeing's successful teaming relationship served, in the
14
end, as a penalty in yet a second way.
The January 1967 parallel source selections following a joint evaluation by the SPO, led to the award of a $6 million contract by the USAF's ASD to Republic- Fairchild and a comparable award to EWR by BWB for the prototype definition phase. By the month following source selection Boeing scaled down its 40-man team at EWR to seven (which continued to support EWR under a third subcontract), while Republ ic-Fairchild built up its team at EWR to about 70 to 80 men. As a residual of the tight EWR-Boeing relationship, and the Boeing content in the EWR design, the Boeing team in Munich gradually tapered off during 1967 and into early 1968.
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Chapter 10 C-6
An agreement had been reached early in this phase allowing each country's representative to have unlimited access to all data generated and submitted to
the joint study group. ^
One of the important deficiencies of the project, which appeared during this phase and continued through to cancellation, was to be the lack of a defini- tion of the system's operational role.^7
4. Prototype Definition Phase
On April 12, 1967, the individual national efforts, i . e . , the German Study
Group and the U.S. project personnel, were combined into a single group known
as the U.S./FRG V/STOL Tactical Fighter SPO (and the SNR established a project
steering committee). Also in April 1967, the German and American contractors
18
set up EFJ, headquartered in Munich.
During the Prototype Definition phase EWR and Republic-Fairchild jointly developed a detailed plan for contractor production of the prototype aircraft. This plan called for the assembly of seven prototypes in the U.S. and five in the FRG. The estimated cost of this stage was $500 million.
By June, 1967, interest within the two customer governments seemed to be drifting toward a more limited prototype program, rather than committment to a production program.
When the evaluation report of the Prototype Definition phase study was com- pleted in late 1967, it indicated that the contractor had satisfactorily
Chapter 10 C-7
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/C1-C16
accomplished the objective of defining general system design and performance specification. This was qualified, however, by the statement, "the contrac- tor's Definition phase final report revealed some omissions and treatments in less depth than was expected." Since this was the contractor's initial propo- sal, it was generally felt however, that these def iciences could have been resolved through negotiation between the SPO and the contractor so as to insure the quality needed by the Acquisition Phase contract. Instead, in January 1968, the Steering Committee decided to cancel the program for an assortment of reasons to be discussed in Section 5 of this sub-chapter.
The principal technical deficiencies of the proposal involved a need for addi- tional analysis in the engineering and technical spheres concerning reliabil- ity and maintainability, plus a need to further refine cost estimates. The first two problems of reliability and maintainability were particularly sig- nificant for such a V/STOL aircraft since it would be operating from dispersed and unprepared sites, and thus requiring a high degree of self-sufficiency.
Another problem concerning cost estimation involved an apparent unwillingness
of the contractor to share cost risk and its use of an inappropriate learning
curve. These, however, were not the primary reasons for the project's 19
demise.
5. Cancellation and the Issues
The SPO was in the process of validating the final reports of the Prototype Definition phase submitted by the contractor EWR, when the U.S./FRG Steering
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Chapter 10 C-8
Committee decided on January 29, 1968 not to enter the Prototype Acquisition phase. The reasons given by the U.S. for the project's termination were that increasing monetary constraints created by the operational demands of the Vietnam War were limiting R & D projects, and that the USAF had not estab- lished an operational requirement for the aircraft. Consequently, the SPO and the program were disbanded by June, 1968.
The lack of a firm USAF operational requirement had haunted the project from
the beginning. The Luftwaffe's interest in a VTOL fighter had been stronger
than the USAF's, but was conditional on having a NATO partner. The Luftwaffe
had no plans to go it alone. Boeing, and later Republic-Fairchild, attempted
to integrate the technology into a specific design, and pursuade the USAF that
such an aircraft was needed. The USAF kept edging up to the line, producing
draft Required Operational Capability (ROC) documents, but wouldn't cross 20
over.
a. On the Plus Side
One objective that was stated as applying to the program generally, but was
not explicitly stated as such in any one of the phases, was the goal of
advancing the technology of both nations. The U.S. advanced its technology
through the investigation of V/STOL concepts as applied to fighter aircraft,
21
while the FRG received valuable knowledge in jet engine technology. EWR went on to use the design staff and knowledge to jointly design, develop and produce the Tornado multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) with the U.K. and Italy.
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Chapter 10 C-9
Another accomplishment of the program was its promotion of the on-going
exchange of V/STOL technical data between the two countries. When the program
terminated, the two countries agreed to a semi-annual conference where
researchers from the AFSC V/STOL Technology Branch would exchange data with
22
their counterparts in the Luftwaffe.
The 1976 GRC study cited the AVS project as an example of the valuable inter- mediary role that SPO can play in improving communications and facilitating the work of industrial firms in a collaborative development project. The SPO was located at Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio, and incorporated about 20 German engineers. "One of the bright spots of this ill-fated prgram was the smooth functioning of government and industry people at the technical level."23
Yet another plus for the project according to Baas, was German government and
industry having obtained valuable insight from its U.S. partners (first Boeing
from 1964-1967 and then Republ ic-Fairchild from 1967-1968) into the systems
approach to the design and development of complex weapon systems. The U.S.
Government and its aviation industry had developed sophisticated management
and production practices that had been proven in past programs. The German
participants were therefore introduced to advanced management concepts, and
24
the knowledge acquired in the U.S. in systems development. In the words of
one Boeing engineer assigned to the EWR technical assistance team, "German
government and German industry got out of it 80% of what they wanted in both
25
technology transfer and systems management know-how".
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Chapter 10 C-10
Three additional justifications for pursuing the project were that: it com- plemented the U.S./U.K. Pegasus engine effort; it would probably have had some net Balance of Payments (BOP) benefits for the U.S. ; and it would contribute to the increased standardization of the two countries' equipment. But since
the project never advanced beyond the paper studies phase, these obviously 26
came to naught.
b. Reasons for Terminating
One factor contributing to the demise of the U.S./FRG V/STOL fighter program was "not invented here" (NIH) syndrome. As a means of minimizing competition head-on with the highly developed U.S. industrial base, European industries began actively seeking out in the early 1 60 ' s those special fields wherein the
U.S. had expressed little interest. One of these in which a large amount of
27
development work had been accomplished by the Europeans was VTOL aircraft. Considerable criticism was directed at the U.S. for not taking advantage of this know-how through direct purchase or license agreements, but rather learn- ing what Europe had already learned. In any case, with the decision in the early 1 70 1 s to directly purchase the AV-8A Harrier from Britain to provide the U.S. Marines with a VTOL fighter, plus obtain a complete data package for further development of that system (the AV-8B), as well as produce the Franco- German Roland II missile system under license, the U.S. attitude belatedly began to show signs of change on this point.
One underlying reason for the program's termination was reportedly the reluc- tance on the part of the Air Force, with some backing in DDR&E, to place the
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/C1-C16
Chapter 10 C-ll
development of a front-line fighter in the hands of another country. This
concern involved both considerations of security and the difficulties antici-
28
pated in international R&D . Just compare this project, or the MBT-70 for that matter, with the successful NATO Seasparrow project, where the DoD was willing to risk joint engineering development and production of an improved version of the USN (Basic) Seasparrow system (with only about 10% European content) .
An additional factor, which is probably the most important single factor con- tributing to the program's demise, was the DoD's budget scrimping on all non- Vietnam-oriented programs. This resulted in the DoD's curtailing of several
high-risk research projects, including the V/STOL fighter and an Army corn-
29
petition for a high-speed helicopter. Although less important, the FRG, as well, was experiencing financial problems at the time. The Ministry of Defense was feeling this strain and was reducing its research expenses in favor of operating expenses and the direct purchase of U.S. military equip- ment (e.g., the F-4 Phantom covered in Chapter 11).
Finally, there are the implications of the lack of an operational mission, a point already covered under the Design Study phase. Neither during the Design phase nor the Prototype Definition phase was there any evidence that the USAF had defined an operational mission for a V/STOL fighter aircraft, a condition which persists to this day. This lack of definition contributed to the com- plexity of the aircraft which the industry-government team was attempting to design. The engineers had to design an aircraft that would possibly be used in interdiction, close air support, and reconnaissance roles. The concept of
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/C1-C16
Chapter 10 C- 12
dispersal with minimal support further increased the need for a complex air- craft. But this complexity in turn resulted in decreased reliability and maintainability which either increases the quantity required* or increases the need for logistic support. These alternatives proved to be both expensive and working at cross-purposes with the original concept of concealment and mobility.^0
6. Summary
According to the Baas study the program cannot be considered a complete fail- ure. Part of its objective was to advance technology and promote the exchange of data* both of which were accomplished, though the desirability of the lat- ter point was somewhat debatable as far as the Germans were concerned. The German government, along with Messerschmitt and Boelkow, also obtained valua- ble insight into the systems approach to design and development of complex weapon systems. This was transferred directly to the subsequent Tornado MRCA effort.
The difficulties of the program, which in any event never had more than luke-
31
warm backing in the U.S., can be classified as financial and technical.
Probably the most important single factor contributing to the program's early demise was the U.S. defense budget being stretched in order to support the war in Vietnam, causing R&D efforts to be curtailed. The cost of the proposed program was highly uncertain with the government and industry differing as to the amount and the sharing of risk. The FRG was also forced to reduce R&D
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/C1-C16
Chapter 10 C— 13
funds so as to assist in offsetting the cost of maintaining U.S. troops in the FR6.32
The technical difficulties stemmed from the USAF's inability to define an operational mission for a V/STOL fighter. The anticipated problems in relia- bility and maintainability were a result of the complexity of the aircraft
design. And finally, there was strong feeling in the U.S. and the DOD towards
33
procuring only weapon systems of U.S. origin.
And as one final point, the teaming of firms from different nations prior to a common source selection surfaced a critical issue for joint design and devel- opment projects where the U.S. is one of the participants. The issue emanates from the differing U.S. and European competition policies (generally speaking, structural versus behavioral) and especially as they apply to defense procure- ment. The USAF's dilemma and the reversal of its position on the Boeing- EWR (i.e., Messerschmitt-Boelkow) teaming relationship in the final days of the competition provides yet another example of the difficulty of finding a good fit when the U.S. is a partner in a joint design and development project.
7. Sequel
As the FRG was depending on the AVS program (at least originally) to provide its next generation fighter, a feasible design and partnership was required to replace it. Fortunately for the Germans, the British as well had found them- selves in a similar situation with half a fighter program, after the French had dropped out of the two year old Anglo-French Variable Geometry (AFVG) air-
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/C1-C16
Chapter 10 C-14
craft project in mid-1967. Discussions began in May 1968 between the British and German governments (joined by several others) in Brussels within a NATO working group and led to the signing of an MOU later in the year. The new aircraft was to be Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) Tornado (See Chapter 8).
Meanwhile the intra-German and interallied partnerships established during the AVS project were to have a decisive long-term impact, in parallel with the launching of the MRCA project. Consolidation of the German aerospace industry had proceeded with the owners of joint EWR subsidiary finally making the plunge. Messerschmitt, Boelkow and Siebelwerke merged in mid-1968 to form Messerschmitt-Boelkow which, now compliant with the German government's demands for concentration of the aerospace industry, was designated by the government to be the German partner firm in the new joint project, the MRCA Tornado. Furthermore, MB's selection to be the German industrial participant was the result of its having won the prior AVS competition. This in turn was the fruit of the intense collaborative relationship built up over the 1964 to 1967 period with Boeing. The year following the MB merger and the launching of the MRCA Tornado project, 1969, the consolidation efforts took another step further with MB-Hamburger Flugzeugbau (owned by the Blohm family) merger to form MBB.
The other AVS partner, the U.S. Government, followed its own course which indirectly led to another joint VTOL fighter project involving the U.S. and the U.K. during the 1970' s. Though a VTOL mission never did surface in the USAF, another service, the U.S. Marine Corps, did have a requirement for a VTOL ground support fighter. In 1971 the USMC bought into the British AV-8A
Chapter 10 C- 15
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/C1-C16
Harrier program with a purchase of 110 aircraft and the technical data pack- age. The Pegasus engine utilized by the Harrier was the fruit of an earlier joint U.S.-U.K. effort interrelated with the AVS. After a series of joint and unilateral improvement programs the two governments went forward in 1981 with the 400 aircraft AV-8B Harrier program (See Chapter 9).
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10/C1-C16
Chapter 10 C-16
1 See Chapter 5 for a description of the ill-fated NBMR procedures (1959— 66) and a short history of NBMR 3 in particular.
2 The Mirage II flying test bed/prototype underwent a short history of con- siderable hover and flight testing prior to its crash in the summer of 1962. Deficiencies centered on the flight control system and engine instability. Following the crash, Dassault built a new and larger VIOL aircraft, the Balzac, which though externally similar to the Mirage II was a completely different aircraft.
Back in 1959, Dassault and Boeing had signed a technical exchange agree- ment on VTOL aircraft. Boeing had been doing considerable wind-tunnel testing on a design similar to Dassault's Mirage II. Over the following three years Boeing provided Dassault with wind-tunnel test data in exchange for Dassault's flight test data. The agreement proved to be a very beneficial one from both firms' viewpoints. (Source: Tom Lollar, one of several Boeing engineers involved in the effort.)
3 Capt. Melvin T. Baas, United States Involvement in Co-development: An Analysis of the US/FRG V/STOL Fighter Aircraft and NATO Sea Sparrow
Project, a thesis presented to the Air Force Institute of Technology,
August, 1971, pp. 26 and 32.
4 Ibid.
5 This issue resurfaced in the fall of 1971, during negotiations between the U.S. and U.K. Governments, and Rolls-Royce (having since absorbed Bristol Siddeley) and Pratt & Whitney and General Electric, over the licensed production of the Pegasus 11 (powering the AV-8A Harrier) and a joint license-development program based on the Pegasus 11. The U.S. Government claimed it retained limited proprietary patent rights to the Pegasus engine from the previous MWDP funding. This issue took several years of negotiations at the governmental level to resolve. (Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 8, 1971, p. 16).
6 Baas, op. cit. , pp. 17-18.
7 "Cancellation of U.S. /German V/STOL Fighter Won't Hinder Important Lift/Cruise Engine," Aerospace Technology, Feb. 12, 1968, p. 12.
8 Baas, op. cit., p. 23.
9 Interviews with Robert E. Kesterson, U.S. Roland Marketing Manager,
Boeing Aerospace Company., February 1982, formerly of the Boeing AVS engineering staff in Munich from October 1964 to January 1968.
10 The first MRCA Program Manager was Ludwig Boelkow himself.
11 Kesterson, op. cit.
12 Ibid.
Chapter 10 C— 17
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10, p. C-17-C-18
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Baas, op. cit., p. 23.
16 Ibid., p. 24.
17 Ibid., p. 28.
18 Ibid., p. 17.
19 Ibid., pp. 28-30.
20 Kesterson, op. cit.
21 Baas, op. cit.
22 This point was evidently somewhat debatable. A contrary view was expressed in the FRG a year after the project had ended— a view which also is a good example of the sensitivity of the issue of data exchange. At that time the next generation of fighters was expected to be V/STOL. This was a field in which the FRG had done considerable research and operational testing. In the words of the one official, "We exchange all our V/STOL information with the U.S. We are very much afraid that eventually we will be buying back our own know-how." "U.S. Pressure Against European Fighter Seen", Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 13, 1969, p. 20.
|
23 |
GRC op. cit., p. 257. |
|
|
24 |
Baas, op. cit., p. 28. |
|
|
25 |
Kesterson, op. cit. |
|
|
26 |
Ibid., pp. 27-8 and 30-1. |
|
|
27 |
Another such area was all-weather, short-range, systems, i.e., Roland, Crotale, and Rapier. |
low altitude air defense |
|
28 |
"Cancellation", op. cit., p. 12. |
|
|
29 |
Aviation Week & Space Technology, Feb. 12, 1968, |
p. 27. |
|
30 |
Baas, op. cit., pp. 33-4. |
|
|
31 |
Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 29, |
1968, p. 28. |
|
32 |
Baas, op. cit., p. 35. |
|
|
33 |
Ibid. |
Chapter 10 C- 18
FOXC/Disk 443/Ch. 10, p. C-17-C-18
D. MALLARD
i
1. The MOU (1967)
The U.S., Canada, UK, and Australia agreed in 1967 to jointly develop a large scale communication system for tactical warfare purposes in the 1975 - 1985 time frame. The system, representing the largest and most involved communica- tions project for tactical purposes seen to date, was to involve a combination of radios, microwave, and satellites, as well as being capable of voice and message traffic (with the emphasis on the latter).^
The objective was to procure the system at a reasonable cost for the common
use of the Armies, Navies, Air Forces and Marine Corps of the four nations,
while taking advantage of the broader base of technology that could be offered
by the four national industries during development. A worthy, if overly
2
ambitious objective.
Project Mallard began officially on April 6, 1967 , when the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a tripartite MOU for the U.S., one which Canada and Australia had signed several days previ ousl y . Britain, the project's origina- tor, did not sign immediately. The British held out for a commitment for a
3
fixed percentage of Mallard production.
The original MOU included the following key features:
the R&D effort would be distributed nationally in proportion to their financial contributions.
patent rights would be shared by the participating nations.
£
Chapter 10 D-l
each nation's industry would have the opportunity to compete for a share of production equal to that go vernmnent' s requirement.
Negotiations continued with the British after the signing of original MOU, and
led to the signing of a revised one in September, 1967. Though not successful
in obtaining a fixed percentage in the end, the British were satisfied by a
compromise provision which involved competition on equal terms with the other
three national industries for 50% of the project - with the other half being
4
guaranteed nationally on the basis of the number of systems required.
2 . Managing the Concept Formulation Phase (1967-69)
The focal point for direction and supervision of the four national efforts, a Program Management Board (PMB) and the International Joint Engineering Agency
c
(JEA) were set up at Fort Monmonth, New Jersey. The PMB consisted of the four national Program Managers. The JEA was the professional engineering entity which identified and recommended the work to be accomplished, and moni- tors its accomplishment, particularly from a technical and systems point of 6
vi ew.
Most of the work was accomplished by the four national industries under the direction and supervision of the national and international management and technical authorities. As of November, 1968, over $19 million had been obli- gated for development work by industry including:
three major competitive system studies (two by U.S. firms and one by a Bri tish fi rm) , and;
Chapter 10 D-2
27 Technique Support efforts directly related to the application of communication/computer technology to the Mallard system.7
Hardware companies that were providing competitive recommendations for the ultimate design of the Mallard system, its subsystems and equipments included RCA;
Sylvania;
Litton Industries;
IBM;
Plessey;
Marconi ;
Standard Telephone and Cables, and;
General Electric.
The competing software companies included:
Hughes;
Westi nghouse;
Operations Research, Inc., and;
Planning Research Corp.
A large number of other firms from the four nations were doing Technique Sup- port work. ^
As of November, 1968 , the Program Management Board (PMB) could report that, after 18 months of initial organization and development work on the project; the Concept Formulation phase of the program was completed by mid- 1969 , and
Chapter 10 D-3
was followed by the commencement of the contract definition phase, which was
expected to be completed by mi d- 1971 , to be followed by engineering develop-
g
ment and initial production in 1974-75 .
3. The Joint Project Unravels During the Contract Definition Phase (1969-70)
However, by 1969 signs of trouble were beginning to appear as a result of var- ious program difficulties covered below. In reviewing the fiscal 1970 Appro- priations Request, Congress asked that the DOD consider the discontinuance of U.S. participation in the project. On October 3, 1970, in the face of con- tinued Congressional objections to the project and a lack of support within the DOD, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard announced the termination of U.S. participation in the Mallard project The program was cancelled as a joint venture the following month, after some 3 years, and for the U.S., an investment of some $34 million.^
4 . Trainer's Analysis: Lessons Learned
The following 8 points were listed as key problems of the Mallard project by Richard J. Trainer in his 1976 study Barriers to the Transfer of Military Systems Technology to the United States.
( 1) Source of Requirement
Instead of originating from an operational requirement identified by the user, the concept's source was the international R&D community, the users being brought in somewhat later. The users representati ves having been less
Chapter 10 D-4
involved early on in the project, is felt to have contributed to its early 12
demise.
(2) Unity of Requirement Community
The Armor, Infantry and Artillery branches of the U.S. Army tend to exhibit considerable solidarity when one of its weapon systems are subjected to criti- cism. The Mallard program, however, was defended by the Signal Branch, a branch lacking the clout typical of those associated with combat systems.
This problem was doubtlessly further exacerbated by the difficulty involved in
13
conceptualizing a complex electronic system.
(3) Requirement Not Specific
The statement of the requirement for Mallard was not specific with regards to
frequencies, line capacities, computer capacities and interoperabil i ty with
related electronic systems. This latter problem was further aggravated by a
14
lack of strong central control of the design of these related systems.
(4) Resource Requirements Not Specified
There was no agreed on estimate for the total cost of R&D or procurement, the
phase-in schedule, or how the overall communication system was expected to
15
operate during the long phase-in period.
( 5) Other Military Services Not Sufficiently Involved
Mallard was to involve the other U.S. military services, not just the U.S.
Army though the Army was to be the largest user and was executive agent for the United States. Even though it is natural that the Army was the principal
4>
Chapter 10 D-5
provider of manpower, the number of full-time members each assigned to the project office is somewhat indicative of their individual levels of involve- ment. As of mi d- 1 969 the Army had assigned 109 personnel , the Air Force 13, and the Marine Corps. 1 . ^
(6) NATO Interface
The value of such a system as the Mallard would be principally its use in the event a war in Europe, one which would involve our NATO allies, especially the FRG . Yet, the FRG was not involved in the program. Canada suggested that Mallard be offered to NATO as a cooperative project. Later the UK suggested that the FRG be included as a fifth partner. Nothing ever came of these sug- gestions , though.^
In any event, after the program's cancellation, the need for better tactical communications inter-operability still remained. The prospects for such a project shifted to the NATO level shortly thereafter. The NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS) organization was established the following year, in May 1971. The plan was that NICS would ultimately include a totally inte- grated automated satellite communications system which could link tactical
1 8
units through mobile stations sometime in the late 1980's.
(7) Organizational Structure
The organizational structure for Mallard was complicated, undoubtedly the result of the involvement of four nations, plus the four American services. This complex structure most likely contributed to the lack of discernible progress during the first two years of the program. This in turn resulted in
Chapter 10 D-6
the undermining of the authority of the Mallard Program Manager as higher
19
level staff offices became increasingly involved in program detail.
( 8) Congressional Attitudes
Some observers attributed the programs lack of success simply to a lack of
Congressional support, but the previous paragraphs provide evidence that there
was more to it than just that. Nevertheless, it is true that by 1969 - 1970,
the Congressional attitude toward Mallard was decidedly unfriendly. The
Mallard project was caught in the wake of Congressional disenchantment with
20
the slippages and cost overruns of the MBT-70 program.
5. Sequel: From Mallard to Tri-Tac and the RITA-based MSE System
As is often the case with these inter-allied programs this was not the end of the matter. With the collapse of Mallard, the US and the UK embarked in 1971 on their own battlefield communications systems, Tri-Tac and Ptarmigan respecti vely. The British met an urgent interim requirement by using existing hardware from the Bruin system. 21
The U.S. Army's Tri-Tac was aimed at providing a tri-service tactical communication system which would make use of the existing analog inventory, while at the same time establishing common standards which would permit the use of newer digital technology as it became available.
In the original Tri-Tac system, mobile radio subscriber equipment was to be used only in forward areas where it would be impossible to locate mobile
Chapter 10 D-7
nodal switching centers. However, in 1982, the US Army discovered that it was practical to use these large containerised nodal switches at divisional HQ level and it was decided to use mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) from brigade HQs down, with the original Tri-Tac units used in the rear echelons. 22
This change of plan was due in part to the size and weight of these switches, and also as a result of revised operational requirements which were affected by a shortage of skilled military personnel required to operate the original system.
As a result of this change, the original SI billion MSE part of the program increased to over $4 billion, with a requirement to equip 25 US divisions. In 1983 the US Army called for new bids for this greatly expanded MSE program.
Since no suitable hardware was available from any of the US electronics companies and because of the desire by the Pentagon to get the Tri-Tac program back on course as quickly as possible, the USA was forced to look offshore for
a system. 23
As a result of the Mallard experience and the relatively close liaison between the US and UK military, the US Army based much of its original MSE thought around the single channel radio access element of the Ptarmigan system and at one stage it looked as if the Ptarmigan equipment would be the automatic
choice.
Chapter 10 D-8
Plessey, the prime contractor for Ptarmigan, teamed up with Rockwell and ITT to present its bid to the DoD, while GTE joined with Thomson-CSF to offer a system based on the mobile radio elements of the French RITA system.
The MSE competition developed into one between the more advanced digital technology and largely autonomous single channel radio access element of Ptarmigan, against the field-proven hardware and the relatively high US . domestic content of RITA. 24
Once the decision to adopt elements of one or the other allied system had been made, the much troubled US Tri-Tac system could move back on course. The lengthy detour by the US Army had been forced upon than by the need to change the concept of a major part of the system.
The source selection was held up through the spring and summer of 1985 as a messy diplomatic situation developed. On the one hand French authorities were reported to have intimated to Secretary of Defense Weinberger their stalled AWACS buy could be broken loose if the US made the right choice. The British for their part were trying to appeal to their prior record of purchases and commitments. Appeals to Reagan by British Defense Minister Heseltine through letters and via telephone calls were followed up by Prime Minister Thatcher's intervention with Regan on Plessey's behalf. Again Thatcher was pushing Britain's record of being a 'better' ally, citing the support of SDI in particular. One DoD source was quoted as saying he "had never seen such a power play" among our NATO allies. In the early fall the French system was selected .
Chapter 10 D-9
The RITA system based MSE included the modified GTE AN/TTC-39 S-200 single shelter configured circuit switch (telepone exchange), the RITA radio access unit, the Canadian Marconi AN/GRC-103 or GR-083 1 ine-of- sight radios, the GTE SB-3614 unit level switchboard, a digital group mi 1 ti plexer , the RITA mobile subscriber radios set, the Magnavox TA-954/M2 digital non-secure voice terminal, the Ericsson MF-15 down-the-hi 1 1 microwave radio link, the Magnavox AN/GXC-78 digital facsimile and a RITA-based system control function. 25
It is a hybrid system with GTE claiming that 65% of the total budgeted expenditure will be spent in the USA-generating in the order of 75000 US jobs.
A typical corps-level MSE deployment over a 37500 km square area could involve some 8100 subscribers of which about 6200 would be static and 1900 mobile. 26
In the end, after weaving in and out various collaborative arrangements with the UK, the tortuous route ended up on the opposite shore of the channel. The US Army's tactical battle-field communications system is ultimately to be satisfied in the late 19 80 ' s through an arrangement along the lines of Mode #4 of industrial collaboration in lieu of the original #5 approach of the late 1960‘s. The history of the U.S. Army's tactical communication system serves as another reminder that the inter-allied thread has become an increasingly common element in our acquisition process, whether it be by design or happenstance.
Chapter 10 D-10
1
Richard J. Trainer, Barriers to the Transfer of Military Systems Technol- ogy to the United States, 1976, p, 5. " ~ ~
2
W. J. Baird, 1968, p. 9.
"The Mallard Project - An Editorial," Signal , November,
3 Trainor, op. cit. , p. 5.
4 Ibid.
5 Fort Monmonth is the location of the Army Communication Agency, the Satellite Communication Agency, eight electronic communication laborator- ies and the associated procurement offices.
6 Major General Paul A. Feyereisen, USA, "Mallard - Its Direction and Con- trol," Signal , November, 1968, p. 13.
7 Ibid., p. 17.
8 Ibid., p. 15.
9 Ibid., p. 13.
10 Trainor, op. cit., p. 6.
11 Comptroller General of the United States, Benefits and Drawbacks of U.S. Participation in Military Cooperative Research and Development Programs
with Allied Countries, 1974, p. 38.
12 Trainor, op. cit., p. 6.
13 Ibid., p. 6.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 7.
16 In a 1974 GAO study on Benefits and Drawbacks of U.S. Participation in Military Cooperative Research and Development Programs with Allied Coun-
tries, the reason for the U.S. . having pulled out of the program, was stated to have been primarily this; one of interservice incompatibilities.
17 Trainor, op. cit., p. 7.
18 See Chapter 3.
19 Trainor, op, cit. pp. 7-8.
20 Ibid., p. 8.
21 Robert Raggett, "US Tri-Tac system set to get back on course, 11 Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 November 1985 p. 1067
Chapter 10 D— 11
FOXC/D-Footnotes/Ch. 10, p. D-ll-12
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
Chapter 10 D— 12
FOXC/D-Footnotes/Ch. 10* p. D-ll-12
E. NATO PHM
1. Introduction
The Patrol Hydrofoil Guided Missile (PHM) ships are vessels that combine both marine and aircraft technologies. They are high-perf ormance, rapid reacting combat systems featuring foilborne top speeds in excess of 50 knots!. Six PHM's have been built to date for the U.S* Navy: the Pegasus (PHM-1), designed and built for the NATO program, and its five production series sister ships. Armament consists of: eight RGM-84A Harpoon anti-ship missiles; a 76 mm dual purpose gun for use against air, surface, and shore targets; two MK- 34 chaff launchers for defense against anti-ship missiles2; and a MK-92 Fire Control System to tie them all together. Their technological sophistication makes them well suited for their mission— to operate offensively in coastal waters and narrow seas against major surface combatants and to conduct surveillance screening and special operations. Weighing only 243.5 metric tons and having length of 40 m, a PHM probably carries more weaponry than any other ship its size in the world.
The PHM has amply demonstrated the anticipated technical performance and mission capability that was projected at the program outset.
More than this, Pegasus has made many converts of those who could not earlier conceptualize the tremendous improvements that hydro- foils offer in operating capability or believe that such technology could be provided in an effective reliable system suitable for the Fleet. 3
The PHM ship design resulted from NATO Navy Armanent Group activities between 1969 and 1972. Although the design is based on the much smaller (58.5 ton) USN/Boeing PGH-2 Tucumcari , the system does incorporate a substantial amount
of European equipment.
The genesis of this system represents one of the most superb marketing jobs ever accomplished through the NATO acquisition process. Unfortunately much like earlier NATO projects such as the Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft, the
E-l
Chapter 10
NATO PHM program reflects the common problem of retaining the original par- ticipants in a joint design and development project (Modes #3, #5, and #8 of industrial collaboration) all the way through to production. Difficulty was experienced in maintaining the stability of the lead-ship design and develop- ment program. The U.S. is currently the only country to have undertaken pro- duction. Potential sales to, or production by, NATO members and other allied nations might yet develop over the next several years.
Additionally, the tergiversation within the U.S. government during the 1976-77 period, when the program was on the verge of cancellation conjures up visions of the UK's plight after the U.S. (i.e., McNamara) unilaterally cancelled the Skybolt air-to-ground missile project in 1962. The UK had previously cancelled its own unilateral effort with the understanding that the U.S. would continue Skybolt to fill both nations' requirements.
This aspect of the NATO PHM program brings out something that Europe's three medium powers (France, the FRG, and the UK) often emphasize, i.e., the vulnerability of such programs to unilateral cancellation,^ with the dependent participants being left high and dry. There is also the loss for the other participants to be considered— the technological capabilities generated through the R & D effort. More specifically, a third and closely related considera- tion is U.S. technological dominance and the long term European effort to counter it. Therefore the Europeans have preferred 'joint' development over the U.S. 'interdependent' development preference. The DOD's former policy of supporting interdependent R & D involved the design and development work being unilaterally carried out within one nation (which was more often than not the U.S.), with the end product being available to all partners to the agreement for licensed production. 5 The NATO PHM project was much more in line with the
E-2
Chapter 10
Source: Boeing PHM-1 Pegasus
U.S. approach than that of the Europeans. The interest of the DoD in Mode #8 of industrial collaboration reflects an attempt to bridge this gap through the 'Family of Weapons' concept.
2. The NATO Program is Launched
a. From Project Inception in 1969 to Signing of the MOU in 1972 A decision to proceed with a NATO PHM project was reached in October, 1971, by three nations working within the NATO Naval Armament Group's (NNAG) Project Group 6. After a year long study, the NNAG had selected the hydrofoil as the best of the competing platforms (Conventional Fast Patrol Boats (FPB's) and hovercraft) for a high-speed craft capable of surface attack, surveillance, and barrier operations to meet the growing Soviet surface-to-surface missile threat.
In November 1971 Boeing Marine Systems was awarded a sole-source letter contract by the U.S. Navy for feasibility and "trade-off" studies to determine the size and performance characteristics of a new class of submerged foil military hydrofoil. The ship was to meet the differing mission and combat system requirements of the navies of Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the U.S. A.
The ship's primary mission was to augment the capability of the NATO main sur- face forces, particularly in the Mediterranean and Baltic seas. Although PHM employment was expected to vary according to national concepts of operations, general peacetime operations were to consist primarily of direct surveillance, either in support of task force operations or through shadowing of potential enemy forces, and area surveillance of straits and exits through restricted
E-3
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NATO PHM Participating Nations
An Egyptian Osa-class missile boat underway in 1974. (Navy photo by E. V. Sneed.) The proliferation of such small but lethal craft has concerned naval analysts for years, but the advent of the Phalanx may remove the possibility of “ cheap kills. ”
waters. Wartime operations were to detect and attack enemy surface ship forces .
Back in mid- 1969 one of the NATO Military Commanders (NMC's), CINC South (the Armed Forces South Command in Naples, Italy) had presented to NATO's Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) a requirement for a large number of fast missile patrol boats.
The NATO requirement was generated subsequent to the October War and the sinking of an Israeli destroyer, the Elath, by Styx missiles launched from Egyptian patrol boats. It was initially a response to the threat posed by missile-armed fast patrol boats in the Mediterranean to larger allied combatants .6
The NATO Navy Armament Group's original sub-grouping working the problem. Special Working Group (SWG) 6 on small missile craft, had originally included a wider grouping of 11 nations. SWG 6 first met in the fall of 1969. In addition to Italy, the FRG, and the U.S., there had also been Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the UK. The British, French, Germans, and Canadians were originally promoting their own projects for adoption by several nations to form the basis of a NATO effort, but the U.S. sponsored project eventually prevailed for the reduced grouping of nations.
The threat was soon expanded to include major combatants as well as fast patrol craft, with the result that the entire Allied Command Europe was considered as the threatened area. Further deliberations were deemed necessary and, during the early months of 1970, NATO Exploratory Group Two was
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established to study the concept of a Common Fast Patrol Craft (Guided Missile). This group completed its deliberations in September 1970 and concluded that the submerged foil, hydrofoil craft, basically of the 140-ton size proposed by the United States Navy, was the craft most suitable for meeting the NATO mission requirement. The NATO Naval Armaments Group received this report the following month, accepted the recommendations contained therein, and approved the establishment of NATO Project Group 6 to conduct the planning stages of the program and the initial determination of the ship characteristics. 7
Under the sponsorship and chairmanship of the United States, Project Group 6 held its first meeting in November 1970 at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium and reached general agreement on the management approach to be pursued. It was established that early phases of the program would consist of several "open ended" meetings with participation by all interested countries. Through June 1971, a series of four "open" meetings were held with representa- tives from 10 nations. During this period, United States' representatives presented further hydrofoil baseline design and cost estimates, and ultimately a draft outline for a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The design data pro- vided for the operational performance agreed upon by Exploratory Group Two and incorporated previously expressed national requirements. In addition, as program sponsor, the United States, committed itself at the June, 1971 Project Group 6 meeting to the building of two PHM lead ships if a design satisfactory to at least one other NATO nation could be achieved. 8
At the conclusion of the June 1971 meeting of NATO Project Group 6 in London, it was mutually agreed that active participants of subsequent meetings would be limited to those nations who had formally declared their intent to proceed
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with the cooperative hydrofoil project, and subject to conclusion of an agreed MOU, to formally enter the program as an "engaged" nation and commit resources thereto. Letters of intent were signed and delivered to the U.S. at the July 1971, NATO Project Group 6 meeting by the governments of Canada, Italy, the FRG, and the UK. 9
All the others had to drop out of PG-6 following agreement on the joint fund- ing of a feasibility study. The nations which originally opted to stay on as observers (i .e., non-voting members) of Project Group 6^ were joined later in the year by Canada, and then the UK, both of which backed away from their initial commitments. None of the observer nations ever elected to actually join.
In October 1971, the United States announced its intentions of awarding the lead ship design and construction contract to Boeing, and that the initial effort under the contract would be for additional feasibility design studies. The objective of these studies was to obtain clear agreement on a specific common ship design which would satisfy all engaged nations' requirements . Further, due to the advance in program schedule without having yet obtained a satisfactory MOU, the United States indicated it would proceed at its own expense with the NATO design, share the results of these studies with all engaged nations (with costs to be reimbursed only by those engaged nations which later signed the Memorandum of Understanding), and to conduct all aspects of the design development, contract definitization and management in cooperation with the engaged nations. In November 1971, the United States thus initiated Phase 1 of the lead ship design and construction stage program with the award of a letter contract to Boeing.
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Commencing with the October 1971 meeting, it was intended that Project Group 6 would have three principal tasks: to provide overall guidance, to establish an organization to manage the acquisition process, and to define and develop a technically feasible, economically viable NATO Standard PHM ship system. H Although a Steering Committee was only slated to assume the responsi bi 1 ity for project direction from NATO Project Group 6 once the MOU had been formally signed, with the signing of the second round of letters of intent by only the governments of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany in the fall 1971, it was decided that a provisional Steering Committee be formed by the three engaged nations as an autonomous sub-grouping of NATO PG-6 to guide the project, exercise executive control over the provisional NATO Project Office, and be responsible for the implementation of the design stage until the MOU was signed (the prospective date for which had now slipped to early 1972).
The first provisional NATO Steering Committee meeting took place in Washington, D.C. in January 1972.
Project Group 6 continued to meet into the fall of 1972, but soley as a vehicle for keeping Canada, Denmark, the UK, and the other observer nations informed so that they could later join the project if they eventually elected to do so. By mid-1972 PG-6 observers included only Canada, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Although only three governments had decided to actively participate, future project membership was still not restricted. In the spirit of NATO cooperation, an additional government could join the project at any time following consultation among, and joint negotiation with, the original three corraiii tted nations.
During early 1972 efforts were devoted to completion of the Feasibility Design (completed in March 1972) and completion of a draft PHM MOU suitable for
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Chapter 10
NATO Patrol Hydrofoil Missile (PHM) Project
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ratification. It became clear early in the year that signing of the MOU and commitment of funds would not occur until some appreciable time after draft MOU completion; hence, additional letters of intent, fully acknowledging the specific design and cost schedule obligations being entered into were requested by the United States. These were provided by the governments of Italy and Federal Republic of Germany in April and May 1972, respecti vely.
In November 1972 the MOU for the design and development of two lead-ships was belatedly signed.
b. Distribution of the Technical Data and Work Package among the Three
Nations
Having completed the feasibility study, Boeing^ was awarded the PHM-1 and PHM-2 design and construction contract in February 1973 for $42 million. The contract was awarded by the Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C. on behalf of the three participating navies. These were to be USN ships, there- fore Italy and the FRG shared only in the payment of non-recurring costs. At this time the U.S. Navy planned a follow-on order of 28 additional hydrofoil gunboats if evaluation trials proved successful, while the FRG was to procure 10 PHM's, primarily through license production, and Italy was to procure four for its Navy, either off the U.S. line or through license production.
The FRG and Italy were to receive the technical data package (TDP) for the PHM developed in the U.S. to meet their combined requirements . Total cost for the lead-ship design and construction phase was eventually to come to $128.5 million. In addition to the $42 million dollar award to Boeing (later escalated to $45 million) the balance of the $128.5 million in expenditures went to costs of running the NATO Patrol Hydrofoil Project Office (NPHPO) in
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Washington, D.C., Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and tooling, technical support, and so forth.
National contributions for the funding of this phase through mid-1977 came to
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Italy and the FRG each received, royalty and restriction free, PHM lead-ship technical data packages, complete as of the time of their respective withdrawals. Neither country, though, received the series production TOP.
Though Boeing received the prime contract, European industry provided a significant percentage of the subsystem of the PHM.
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Chapter 10
3. Precursors of the PHM
a. Early Boeing IR&D Projects
Boeing's hydrofoil R&D effort dated back to August, 1959. This included an investment by the Company of an estimated $100 million in R&D by the time the NATO project was launched, as well as another $50 million since.
During that period the Company led the industry in moving the submerged foil concept from experimental demonstrations on Lake Washington and Puget Sound to operational systems deployed by the U.S, the Italian and the Royal Navy in the South China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea, and the Caribbean Sea. In the course of this work, the Company played a significant role in every major U.S. Navy hydrofoil ship program, and has been the leader in hydrofoil waterjet propulsion.
Research began in 1959 at Boeing, and in 1960 a hydroplane test craft with a hull made principally of mahogany plywood was built. Designated the Hydro- dynamic Test System (HTS) and nicknamed Aqua-Jet, the lobster-shaped craft had two prows, each with a cockpit and instrument compartment. The open center was used like a wind tunnel for preliminary hydrodynamic testing. In addition to foils, the craft was used for antisubmarine warfare testing.
Boeing developed a second company-sponsored R&D hydrofoil in 1962, Little Squirt. The three-ton wooden hulled boat was built to prove the feasibility of waterjet propulsion concepts now used on all Boeing designed hydrofoils.
The craft's foil system was arranged in a conventional configuration,
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Chapter 10
primarily to accommodate the installation of a single water jet pump. Although the major contribution of Little Squirt has been in the area of waterjet propulsion, during her years of service, she provided a number of important answers with regard to hydrodynami cs , structure and foil borne control. For example. Little Squirt demonstrated the disadvantages of the "conventional" foil arrangement under conditions of forward foil broach. In this condition, the simultaneous requirements for roll control and foil depth control were found to be impossible to satisfy with a ventilated forward foil, and violent pi tch-roll-yaw motions characteristically resulted. The surface-piercing trailing edge rudder on the aft strut was also shown to provide unreliable directional control because of ventilation and lack of bow-down control area. This experience contributed to the selection of the steerable forward strut for directional control of Boeing hydrofoils.
Little Squirt was also used as a test bed for the development of a number of systems, including the automatic control system and the trai 1 ing-edge concept as a method of hydrodynamic control. The acoustic altimeter, mounted on the bow, and flap controls have been used on all subsequent Boeing hydrofoils. Little Squirt also demonstrated a 50-knot capability for hydrofoils.
b. The USN/Boeing PCH-I
In 1959 the US Navy received Congressional Approval to include in its 1960 Shipbuilding Program a hydrofoil craft suitable for carrying out anti- submarine patrols. This was to be the U.S. Navy's first hydrofoil ship with a ful ly-submerged foil.
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Chapter 10
From among the seven firms bidding, 13 a contract was awarded to the Boeing Company in June I960 for construction of a patrol craft hydrofoil designated the PCH-1. . The vessle was subsequently named High Point. Its design, by the U.S. Navy Bureau of Ships, was based on the successful demonstration of a fully submerged, automatically controlled foil of a small experimental craft built in 1956, named Sea Legs. The Sea Legs was scaled up to the PCH-1 design by the original naval architect, Gibbs & Cox. PCH-1 was detail designed and constructed by Boeing at facilities leased from the J.M. Martinough Shipbuilding Corporation in Tacoma, Washington. The ship was delivered to the USN in 1963.
The High Point is 115 feet long, has a beam of 31 ft and displaces 110 tons. The power plant consists of two Rolls-Royce Proteus marine gas turbines, each delivering 3,000 shp. In the "flying" mode, speeds up to 60 knots have been achieved. The vessel has accommodations for a crew of 13 and currently carries, for experimental purposes, sonar and radar equipment.
An extensive test program with this vessel furnished the first experience with a submerged foil system in all speed regimes. As expected, many technical difficulties, especially in the hydrodynamic field, were encountered.
After the ship passed acceptance trials and was delivered to the U.S. Navy in September 1963, it went into a trials program. As first configured. High Point experienced directional stability and control problems both in calm water and in rough water. These problems included directional divergences and erratic response to the helm.
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Chapter 10
The principal lessons that were learned with regard to directional problems were:
Exclusive use of banked turns is mandatory;
Yaw rate feedback to the rudder is mandatory;
Good directional stability under adverse conditions of relative strut immer- sion in waves is mandatory, and;
A fully steerable forward strut is mandatory.
In the early rough water trials, the High Point also experienced pitch-heave motion problems. Computer studies revealed that while a wide range of possibil- ities exist for satisfactory automatic control under calm water conditions, successful operation in heavy seas can only be accomplished with very special- ized control techniques. It was found that the controlled dynamic response of the ship must be carefully tailored with respect to wave encounter frequency if the full seaway potential of the ship is to be realized. It was also found that the occurrences of foil broaching could be minimized by accepting wave cresting of the hull in seas of wave height in excess of forward strut length.
The application of these studies has subsequently permitted High point to operate successfully in significant waves in excess of 4 meters, well above her speci- fied design requirement for operation in 3 meter significant waves.
The ship completed a series of R&0 trials in 1971 prior to layup for major modification in accord with design changes conceived by Boeing. This major modification, completed in 1973, incorporated many of the technology advances proven by a later USN/Boeing hydrofoil, the PGH-2 Tucumcari, For example, the modified PCH-1 was outfitted with a fully steerable forward strut, dihedral
E-13
Chapter 10
after foils and a new automatic control system of Boeing design. In addition, some of the hydrodynamic deficiencies of the propulsion pod arrangement were corrected by a reconfiguration of the aft foil /strut/pod system.
Chief among the problems encountered in the hydrodynamic field was cavitation. Cavitation can occur in any object moving at high speed through the water.
Vapor cavities form on the upper side of the foil. These are not stable but oscillate rapidly in such a manner that water particles impinge with consider- able force on the foil surface, quickly eroding the toughest metal. The serious ness of the cavitation problem may be judged by the fact that the original propellers of the High Point had a life expectancy of only two hours at 45 knots. 14
The High Point, however, was built to study just such phenomena and a variety of newly designed propellers and erosion-resistant materials to cover the foils and struts were tried. Although it was found that, through careful design, many harmful cavitation-forming conditions can be avoided, they are difficult to eliminate completely. Therefore, the water-jet propulsion approach, a design
which circumvents the propeller-cavitation problem entirely, has generally prevailed over the propeller -driven ship for military purposes and was adopted for all subsequent Boeing designed hydrofoils.^
The PCH-1 is currently based in Bremerton, Washington where it continues to serve as a test platform.
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Chapter 10
c. The USN/Boeinq FRESH I
In June 1961, the year following the PCH contract award, Boeing was awarded a second USN contract for the design and construction of another experimental hydrofoil, the Foil Research, Experimental, Supercavitating Hydrofoil (FRESH I). The FRESH I was to serve as a research platform for experimenting with foil and control systems. The FRESH I, launched in February 1963, was to have had an ultimate speed capability of 100 knots and a required demonstrated cap- ability of 80 knots. Although it never attained its speed objective of 100 knots, it still holds the hydrofoil speed record of 84 knots.
The FRESH I's greatest contribution was in the field of stability and control, where it demonstrated the importance of directional and roll stability. It was tested in two configurations - one foil forward, two foils aft (canard) and two foils forward, one aft (conventional airplane). Propulsion was by a single-aircraft turbofan. Its unique design allowed large variations in foil location
and arrangement and the testing of a wide variety of foil configurations and automatic controls.
The craft was fully instrumented and outfitted with an onboard data acquisition system. The craft repeatedly demonstrated foilborne speed in excess of 80 knots on a foil system utilizing base-vented cambered parabolic sections arranged both in a canard configuration and in a conventional configuration. At these speeds, the highest yet attained by any hydrofoil craft, the foil system was found to be structurally sound and free of hydroelastic problems. As predicted
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Chapter 10
by foil model tests, the only cavitation experienced was stable non-erosive
leading-edge cavitation.
During final acceptance trails for the U.S. Navy on 18 July 1963; the craft broached as a result of being mistrimmed* went into a divergent turn and over- turned. Craft damage was limited to minor non-structural distortion and salt water immersion effects. The craft subsequently was refurbished without basic changes to the configuration, passed trials and was accepted by the Navy in October 1964. As a result of this accident, it was learned that hydrofoils must provide good directional stability under all reasonable conditions of flying height and boat trim. This is directly reflected in the foil arrange- ment and control system configuration of both Tucumcari and the PHM, which provide good directional stability in the broached condition and directional control in bow-down attitudes. The directional stability is achieved through after-foil dihedral, and the dependable directional control is achieved with the fully steerable forward strut.
d. AGEH
The technology developed with the FRESH I was originally scheduled for incorpora- tion in the second phase of yet a third USN hydrofoil project, the 312 ton AGEH Plainview designed by Grumman and built by Lockheed Shipbuilding and Con- struction Company in Seattle, Washington. The AGEH had a maximum speed of 50 knots with a provision for conversion to 100 knots through incorporation of FRESH I developments. Phase 2 of AGEH however, was cancelled.
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Chapter 10
The 312 ton Plainview is currently the world's largest hydrofoil ship. The Boeing Company has participated in the program since 1966, when the U.S. Navy awarded the first of a series of contracts for control simulation studies.
These studies led to the identification and correction of a number of ship control problems and have been a basis for automatic control system redesign work by Boeing under later contracts. Boeing provided the contractor support to the U.S. Navy for the maintenance, modification and operation of the ship and played an active role in overhaul work. Boeing experience with this 312 ton ship provided valuable design knowledge for larger size hydrofoils. For example, the serious hydraulic system problems of the AGEH can be attributed to the developmental nature of the large hydraulic system required for foil- borne control of variable incidence foils. This problem was avoided on the PHM by a reduced hydraulic requirement due to the use of flap control, allowing the use of proven available commercial aircraft hydraulic components.
e. The USN/Boeinq PGH-2 Tucumcari
In 1966, the USN proceeded with the next phase of its hydrofoil program with the award of two fixed price contracts for the design, construction and trials of 58-1/2 ton (60 ton when fueled up) experimental hydrofoil gunboats for test and evaluation by the U.S. Navy. One contract went to Grumman for the vessel designated PGH-1 Flagstaff, and the other to Boeing for the PGH-2 Tucumcari.
The two craft were completed in 1967 and delivered to the USN in 1968, where- upon the each t ran si tted open ocean to San Diego to undergo operational evalua- tion by the Naval Test and Evaluation Forces Pacific.
E-17
Chapter 10
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The two hydrofoil gunboats were to meet performance specifications presented in a Circular of Requirements, each contractor being given complete freedom to design the best vehicle to meet the following foilborne performance requirements
Maximum continuous speed in calm seas Required turn radius in calm seas at 48 knots Calm water range
Helmsman able, to hold heading in 2 meter significant waves
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waves (avg. 1/3 highest) 0.25 g's
Transit 400 nautical miles in rough water at average speed of 40 knots. 1?
Both craft underwent test and evaluation, but no production award ever followed due to Viet Nam War related operational priorities.
Though the U.S. Navy only belatedly completed its formal source selection proc- ess, following deployment to Vietnam^3 and Western Europe, the PGH-2 was evalu- ated in the fall of 1971 as the superior design. With the completion of DSARC I, the U.S. Navy fell in line with the Italian and German navies, and thus cleared the way for the NATO project (the two allied navies having each pre- viously selected the PGH-2 as the basis for derivatives and/or a follow-on system) .
The PGH-2 incorporated design features introduced as a result of the Navy's experience with High Point, key among these being:
- steerable strut and single-foil forward main foils aft (canard);
E-13
Chapter 10
- anhedral foil configuration;^
- gas turbine-driven water-jet propulsion;
- and an electronic/hydraulic control/actuation system.
The Tucumcari operated in seas up to seastate 6 which was well beyond its design requirement. Moreover, the Tucumcari demonstrated that a properly designed hydrofoil ship has maneuver capabilities far beyond those of conventional ships. These capabilities are reflected not only in the ability to achieve high turn rates in all sea conditions, but also in terms of unusually prompt response to helm commands.
The P6H-2 came out ahead of the PGH-1 in the following areas:
reliability (the PGH-1 was only marginally seaworthy); foil arrangements;
control system (e.g.,the PGH-2 was a much simpler system to operate, all ship members could handle it, even the cook).
Furthermore the Tucumcari was on schedule while substantially exceeding perform- ance requirements. The Flagstaff was some eight months behind schedule and unable to meet its technical requirements (e.g. at 64 tons it was 15% over- weight, whereas the Tucumcari met the spec exactly at 58.5 tons).
As for the critical (and still somewhat controversial) area of choice of propul- sion systems, Grumnan had chosen a gear-driven super cavit at ing propeller system for the PGH-1, and Boeing had selected a water-jet propulsion system for its
E-19
Chapter 10
Source: Boeing PGH-2 Tucumcari \
PGi-2. The water jet system proved itself to be the better system, but there were a number of drawbacks, and some quarters of the U.S. N. had trouble recon- ciling themselves. The water-jet avoided the supercavitation problem altogether, had fewer mechanical problems, was less costly to manufacture, and had a sub- stantially better record in the area of reliability and maintainabi lity.20 The drawbacks of the water-jet propulsion approach, in comparison with that of the propeller, were that it consumed 15%-1 7% more fuel and accelerated more slowly.
f . The Boei ng-Itali an P-420 Spaviero and the P-421 Nibbio Class of Mi litary
Hydrofoils: Italian Navy's Derivative of the Tucumcari
(1. ) Boeing Establishes Alinavi in Italy in 1968 and is Awarded the P-420 Spaviero Contract in 1969. In the meantime, unable to obtain USN interest in a PGH-2 production run, Boeing had decided to look elsewhere for a customer and partners to justify further capital investment. This they had found in Italy. In 1968 Boeing established a joint venture in Italy, Alinavi, to market, develop and produce a derivative of its PGH-2 Tucumcari under license from Boeing. Alinavi ownership was originally distributed as follows:
Boei ng 60%
Istituto per la R icostruzi one Industriale (IRI) 30%
Rodriquez 10%
IRI is a holding company for Italian government owned firms, while Rodriquez is a privately owned Italian firm which had produced many surf ace- pi ercing commercial hydrofoils under license to Supramar.
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Chapter 10
Source: Boeing P-420 Spaviero
An engineering development contract was awarded to Alinavi by the Italian government in 1969, one which led to the constructi on of -a lead-ship based on the PGH-2 Tucumcari , the P-420 Spaviero (the Seahawk, or more commonly known in the U.S. as the Swordfish) military hydrofoil. The ship was built and tested at the 0T0 Mel ara facility in La Spezia, Italy. A Boeing team headed up by Harold Turner and fluctuating between 3 and 5 people was located at La Spezia to provide technical assistance on ship design. The Spaviero was launched in May 1973.
(2.) A Comparison of the Spaviero with the Tucumcari. The Italian Navy Spaviero is basically the same ship as the U.S.N's Tucumcari, slightly modi- fied for a much more sophisticated weapons suit. * More or less in line with Boeing's original share of Alinavi ownership, there is about a 60% comnonality between the Tucumcari and its Alinavi derivative, the Spaviero.
The Spaviero' s foil is identical to that of the Tucumcari, and the hull, struts and autopilot are only slightly modified. Even though its hull is only a little wider than that of the Tucumcari, it has a completely different superstructure. The Spaviero has a range of 450 nautical miles at its maximum speed of 50 knots.
The major difference between the 58.5 ton Tucumcari and the 62-ton Spaviero, stems from the latter's armaments. The Tucumcari, as a one of a kind prototype built to evaluate major advances in ship design, was only lightly armed. It was equipped with one manually controlled 40 mm gun forward, two 50 cal iber
E-21
Chapter 10
Spaviero derivative was designed, utilizing a proven ship design, to serve as a replacement for the Italian Navy's conventional fast patrol boats (FPBs).
As such, it had to mount armament typical of the most modern FPBs — i.e. an automatic dual-purpose gun forward, a fire control system, and surface-to- surface missiles aft.
Early studies considered several different gun-missile combinations, with a design-goal weight of 11.3 tons for the weapons suit, and a ship displacement of 59.5 tons. The Italian Navy's final choice specified an 0T0 Mel ara 76 mm Compact gun forward, the same gun later chosen for the NATO PHM. The gun was controlled by an Elettroni ca San Giorgio ( ELSAG) NA 10 mod 1 fire control syste The anti-ship missile chosen for the Spaviero was Otomat.21
This final selection resulted in a weapons suit weight of 14.3 tons, 3 tons over the 11.3 tons originally specified. It was this that necessitated a total redesign of the superstructure and a widening of the hull by 3.5 feet. 22
Other less apparent, but significant, differences between the two craft are the Spaviero' s lighter 400 Hz electrical power system versus Tucumcari's 60 Hz system, and the more efficient dies el -powered steerable- re tractable propeller outdrive for hull borne propulsion (as compared with Tucumcari's waterjet system serving for both hull-borne and foil-borne propulsion.) The main pump and the SEPA stabilization system are also of Italian origin. The Spaviero' s Rolls Royce Proteus gas turbine engine has several hundred shp more than that of the Tucumcari .23
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Chapter 10
(3.) Performance Testing. The year following the Spaviero's launching in May 1973 was spent in final outfitting, normal fir st-of-cl ass debugging, making modifications and improvements shown desirable during testing, and undergoing customer acceptance trials.
Performance testing conclusively demonstrated the Spaviero's outstanding speed and good range capabilities, even with relatively heavy armament. In the process, Boeing-Alinavi hydrofoil technology was shown to be mature, as seen by the close correlation of predicted and actual performance, even after a signifi- cant change in armament following contract signature. Finally, actual perform- ance revealed good growth potential for the craft .24
( 4. ) Operational and Maintenance Savings in Comparison with Conventional FPB's. The economics of operating and maintaining Spaviero and the P-421 class of hydrofoil are especially impressive, both in comparison with conventional fast attack craft and in consideration of the technological advance represented by the system.
Generally, in conventional FPB combat ships, the manning costs alone can add up to as much as half the ship's total "life cost". The Spaviero on the other hand, with its 10-man crew, requires only 25 to 40 percent of the crew (25 to 40 men) typically associated with conventional FPBs carrying similar armament. Manning cost are thus drastically reduced.
Another area of potentially significant savings is in fuel. The Spaviero has only one Proteus gas turbine engine, developing a maximum of 4500 shp. This
E-23
Chapter 10
gives the craft a range of 360 nautical miles at 45 knots, during which time about 8 tons of fuel are burned. A conventional FPB, such as the Combattante II, has three times the installed horsepower, and will burn three times the fuel (approximately 25 tons) to travel the same distance, and at a speed of only 30 knots. 25
Maintenance is best considered by discussing those major components of a hydro- foil which differ significantly from the corresponding components of a conven- tional craft: i.e., the structure, including foils and struts; the flight control system; and the foil borne propulsion system. Other components of the hydrofoil are for the most part similar or identical to the correspond!' ng com- ponents of conventional craft, and therefore maintenance is similar. 25
The foils and struts are made of corros ion-res istant stainless steel. The only maintenance consists of periodic replacement of flap bearings and, if the client so desires, repainting of the struts for aesthetic reasons.
The flight control system comprises two basic el ements: the electronic portion represented by the automatic control system; and the hydraulic system with associated mechanical linkages. The automatic control system consists of hermeti cal ly seal ed solid-state components and, as such, requires no routine maintenance. The hydraulic system consists of 3,000 psi components, many of which have been proven in hundreds of thousands of hours of jet aircraft flight, and which have been designed specifically to require low maintenance and provide high reliability (after more than 30 months operation, the Tucumcari was reported to have never experienced a flight malfunction) .27
E-24
Chapter 10
The Italian Military Requirement
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The foilborne water- jet propulsion system consists of inlets, ducting, a- Rolls- Royce Proteus gas turbine engine driving a large pump through a flexible cou- pling, and nozzles. The maintenance requirements of the Proteus turbine (uti- lized on both the PCH-1 High Point and the PGH-2 Tucumcari) are well known due to its wide adoption by many of the world's navies, and need not be mentioned here. The pump for its part is made up of exceptionally maintenance-free
components. 28
( 5. ) Series Production in Italy of the P-421 Nibbio Class Under License to Boeing. In November 1974 Boeing opted out of its equity participation role in Alinavi,, becoming simply a licensor. This was necessary for Alinavi to qualify for the award of a follow-on contract from the Italian government.
Italy's new Ten-Year Military Program Law had been written so as to require that any shipyard receiving a contract be fully Italian owned. Boeing and Rodriquez sold their shares to the Italian government owned Cantieri Naval i Riuniti of the Fincantieri Group (which also assumed those of I. R. I. ) along with the right to build and sell the P-420 class of hydrofoil world- wide, while retaining the rights to a royalty on all vessels sold. Through a licensing agreement (Mode #1 of industrial collaboration) Boeing could still assure itself a return on investment while avoiding the risk inherent in equity participation. In 1930 Alinavi ceased to exist, being fully absorbed by Cantieri Naval i Riuniti (CNR).
Having dropped out of the NATO program in late 1974 for what was to have been the PGH-2 follow-on vessel (and one derived from a military requirement generated by NATO* s AFSouth Command in Naples, Italy) the Italian government
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committed itself instead, in 1977, to series production of the smaller military hydrofoil. CNR is now building six additional P-421 class hydrofoils for the
Italian Navy in La Spezia. One was to be launched in 1979 and the remaining 5
in 1980 and 1981, at intervals of four months. The first unit for series pro- duction, the P-421 Nibbio, began sea trials in late 1980. of the spring of 1983 five of the ships had been launched with the sixth one scheduled for later in the year. Foreign sales had yet to materialize, but CNR was optimistic to its chances of closing with several prospective customers in the near future.
Boeing received its first royalty payment from CNR in December 1980. The sin,
paid in Italian Lira came to around $600,000. The royalty to Boeing Marine
Systems for the first three series production ships will be 5.2% of the ship sales price, jimping to 7.0% for all subsequent ships produced. For all licensed parts production the royalty will be 5.2%. As would be expected in any license production program, CNR is still procuring from Boeing Marine Systems under an Umbrella Purchasing Agreement, a limited amount of hardware and techni- cal assistance.
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4. Boeing* s European Technical Marketing Activities
for a PGH-2 Follow-on System:
September 1969 to November 1971
Meanwhile, following shortly upon the successful landing of the contract from the Italian Navy for construction in Italy of a Tucumcari derivative, the P-420 Spaviero military hydrofoil, Boeing began to weave a more ambitious web of interrelationships that would lead to a NATO PHM program, for a Tucumcari follow- on ship.
a. European Marketing Activity from September 1969 to September 1970 In September 1969, the Manager of the Boeing Marine Systems (BMS) Organization within the Boeing Aerospace Company, Mr. A. M. Gonnella, was in Brussels to support a presentation on military hydrofoils to the NATO Naval Armament Group's (NNAG) permanent Information Exchange Group (IEG) on Ship Design, IEG #6, at the request of Captain A1 Carrier of Op-72. Op-72 was responsible for the
U.S. Navy's international information exchange agreements.
The following month, also at the request of Op-72, Boeing's former Tucumcari Program Manager, Gene Myers, gave a presentation to the French Navy. On the same trip Myers also made a presentation to the German Navy, but this time at the initiative of a Boeing consultant. General Hentz, Bundeswehr (ret.). The principle German participant at this meeting was a civil servant, Mr. Von Knobloch, the Bundesmarine1 s chief architect specializing in hydrofoil s.^9
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In November, Myers was back in Brussels for the next NNAG IEG 6 meeting, which had since set up a provisional sub-grouping Special Working Group (SWG) on Small Missile Craft. This SWG was also numbered 6, but for a different reason. This was the sixth such provisional SWG set up by the NNAG. A second presenta- tion was given by the U.S. Navy, this time on a 'Double Tucumcari' design ( 928-33H), i ncorporating two Rolls Royce Proteus marine turbine engines. Later the same month Chuck Slater of the Boeing Rome Office was up in Bergen, Norway at a Fast Patrol Boat Conference. It was on this occasion that the interest of the German Navy was first engendered, in the persons of a Captain Klose and Commander Max Mueller of the Fuehrungsstab Marine (FueM, or the German Navy General Staff). Klose later was to become head Sea Admiral for the German Navy and Mueller was to run the German PHM Project office in Bonn. 30
In December 1969, Boeing provided a cost estimate on the 'Double Tucumcari' to Captain Max Cooke of the OASD/ISA (Qp-723B ) , who transmitted it to the SWG -6 members during its January, 1970 meeting.
Following up on the January meeting of NATO's SWG-6 in Brussels, Myers held technical discussions in Bonn with the Technical Division (DivT) of the German MoO (Von Knobloch was again the principal German participant) and in Britain with the British Navy and Yarrow Shipyard. The latter involved the first move to interest European industry (in addition to governments) in participation in Boei ngr s next generation military hydrofoil. Later the same month, came a meeting with a senior British civil servant. Jack Daniels, Director of War Ships for British Shipbuilding.-^
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In April 1970, Myers headed up a Boeing team that held further technical dis- cussions in Bonn with the German MoD's DivT and in Bath with the British Navy.
In late summer, the USN committed itself to deployment of the Tucumeari to Europe. This was a major program milestone for the PHM in that it showed the USN was now committed to continuing its recently frozen hydrofoil efforts.
Capt. Larry Kelly succeeded in obtaining the support of the new Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Zumwalt for a limited European deployment of the PGH-2. At a NATO SWG-6 meeting in Brussels in September 1970, the USN gave a presentation of the PX(H) design, later renamed PHM. It was the same meeting that the USN announced it would deploy the Tucumeari to Europe the following spring.
In addition to supporting the NATO presentation in Brussels, later the same month a Boeing team participated in another round of technical discussions with the British Navy in London. 32
Meanwhile, discussions with the Germans had begun to rapidly pick up momentum in lata spring and in May and June there was a further round of technical and business discussions with DivT, FueM the Bundesamt fuer Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung (BWB),33 ind the German technical support contractor Marinetechnik Planungs-Gesellschaft (MTG) of Hamburg. In July 1970
Myers gave another presentation in Bonn to the FueM and DivT covering three alternative designs each with a different engine: four Lycoming TF35C*s, one G.E. LM 1500, and the 2 Rolls Royce Proteus. 3^ By this time, some skepticism
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was beginning to surface in the German Navy as to whether the NATO project would ever get underway. Consequently, the Bundesmarine was beginning to con- sider a national solution to its requirement.
b. The Bundesmarine Moves towards a Unilateral Solution to the Military
Requirement
The Bundesmarine plays an essential role in denying the Warsaw Pact quick and easy dominance of the North Atlantic by performing several NATO assigned mis- sions in the Baltic. Those missions for which the Bundesmarine was consider- ing the adoption of a military hydrofoil to replace its conventional fast patrol boats were:
Shadowing Major Combatants— Prior to hostilities, shadowing of major com- batants, particularly large amphibious ships and heavy missile cruisers is essential to ascertain intent, determine magnitude of the buildup, act as a tripwire, be in a position to counterstrike the high value targets, and transmit an attack warning if hostilities begin.
- Minefield Defense— As the Soviets have invested in several hundred mine- sweepers, it is presumed that these ships would be in the vanguard of the attack forces exiting the Baltic. Forces would be committed to counter those minesweepers.
- Interdicting Amphibious Task Groups— 8y careful and deliberate target selection, a mission kill on a task group can be achieved by a relatively small number of effective surface combatants.
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In mid-1970 the Bundesmarine canceled, its own low-level four year effort for a hydrofoil for Baltic Sea missions, realizing that it couldn't catch up with Boeing.35 In August and September 1970, a Boeing team entered into discussions at MTG directed toward the development of requirements for a new German hydrofoil, designated by MTG as the Kleines Kampfboot (KKB ) -162 .
Boeing technical assistance to the Bundesmarine picked up again at the end of 1970 and continued through the first half of the following year. Once again they were working with the Bundesmarine' s support contractor, MTG, in Hamburg.
In November a Boeing engineering team led by Dick Merritt was sent to Wilhelmshaven in northern Germany to provide assistance to the Bundesmarine' s Marine amt, in development of the German military requirement.35
c. Mari net echnik PI anunqs-Gesel 1 schaf t (MTG) mbH
When the Federal Republic of Germany began to rebuild its armed forces in the mid-1950's, the original approach adopted involved the award of contracts for- both design and development of warships to one contractor. By the mid-1960' s it had become apparent to many that this approach to acquiring warships should be changed. Contracting with a large number of shipbuilders to develop the vessels was felt to have resulted in a less than adequate arrangement because of the resultant coordination difficulties, especially with respect to weapon systems integration. Moreover, following the conclusion of a program, some of the shipbuilding companies frequently dissolved their design offices which led to the loss of advanced know-how. Consequently, The German Ministry of Defense directed industry to establish one private company to serve as the Bundesmarine' s permanent planning and design center, working under contract to BWB on all FRG naval shipbuilding programs.3?
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MARINETECHNXK
SHAREHOLDERS OF THE GROUP OF COMPANIES
Following the initiative of the Ministry of Defense, Marine-Schiffstechnik PI anungs-Gesell schaf t (MSG) mbH was founded by five shipyards, whereas six companies of the electronic industry founded the Marine-Elektronik Planungs- Gesell schaf t (MEG) mbH. As a common instrument for all outside contacts, the companies founded the Mari net echnik PI anungs-Gesell schaf t mbH.
X
The three companies started their operation in 1966 when the participating industrial companies transferred experienced engineers to the new companies, which formed the nucleus of the new engineering staff. 38
MSG (capital DM 300 000) is owned by the following five shipbuilding companies: Blohm & Voss AG (40%), Howaldtswerke Hamburg AG (18%), Bremer Vulkan (18%), Friedrich Luerssen Werft (15%), and Lubecker Maschinenbau AG (9%).
MEG (capital DM 300 000) is owned by Friedrich Krupp Atl'as-Elektronik, AEG/Tele funken, N.V. Hollandse Signal apparaten. Standard Elektrik Lorenz AG, Siemens AG, and Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werke GmbH (VFW), each holding a 1/6 share. 39
In 1972 a third company became a MTG shareholder, the Marine-Unterwasserregelan lagen-Planungsgesell schaf t (MUG) mbH. This company had been founded in 1967 and is engaged in the field of underwater warfare.
All four companies have their offices in Hamburg, where they are located in one building. Their work ties them closely together and they regard them- selves as one unit.
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The Marinetechnik (MTG) group employes a total of 280 people. 200 of these are engineers. All are experienced naval architects, electronics and weapons people who are assigned to MTG by the shareholding companies.
Since Marinetechnik is working for the government and its shareholders are competing among themselves, it is generally understood and agreed upon by all parties involved, that the company must observe strict neutrality. Each employee therefore has committed himself in writing not to forward any private informa- tion he has received from any partner to any third party, without prior agree- ment by the originator. Being a planning and design agency, Marinetechnik has no interest in delivery of hardware. This provides some degree of assurance that the company is able to minimize conflicts of interest.4^
The planning and design of all the Federal German Navy's surface ships has since been entrusted to Marinetechnik. In the case of warships or other naval weapon systems, Marinetechnik is the only industrial company to receive direct contracts for the Preplanning and the Concept Phases. 4^
d. Germany's MTG and Boeing Team Up to Develop System Specifications for the
KKB-162 under Contract to the 3WB
In August 1970, Boeing was requested by the German MOO to offer a hydrofoil boat design as an alternative to that of its own. Meeting in Hamburg at MTG in late August, one of MTG's two co-directors, Hans -Joachim Fruendt, indicated MTG's strong interest in becoming a subcontractor to Boeing for the German program. This was part of a general effort by MTG to expand its clientele to include industrial firms. The two Boeing representatives at the meeting.
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Dick Merritt of Boeing Seattle and W. W. Mueller of Boeing International Corpora- tion (BIC) Bonn Office, expressed Boeing's interest in MTG's help, especially in the areas of regulations and cooperation with the German Government, as well as interpretation of military requirements.
Herr Fruendt suggested that MSG could assist Boeing during the proposal phase not only by supplying information on German Navy Standards and Regulations and equipment selection, but cooperate with Boeing on a purely technical basis, in particular in the areas of: weight studies, compartmental.i zati on , ventilation, noise and heat insulation, interior layout, power plant installation, electrical wiring layout, and electrical power requirements.
The following month Boeing awarded a subcontract to MTG to assist in proposal preparation in Seattle over a six week period. The technical assistance con- tract was for:
a marine engineer familiar with outfitting, furnishing, and mechanical subsystems;
- a logistics specialist familiar with manuals training, spares, and the general logistics requirements of the Bundesmarine, and;
an electronics engineer familiar with weapon systems and electronics integration.
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The MTG personnel also brought with them catalogues and other appropriate data with which to assist Boeing in the selection of components and standards.
( 1 . ) Boeing offers its hydrofoil ship design, designated the Model 928-70. The Boeing Model 928-70 design was for a 230-ton 36.3 meter submerged-foil ship that was based on the much smaller Tucumcari, utilizing turbine powered waterjet propulsion, and designed specifically for Bundesmarine and its NATO assigned operational responsibilities in the Baltic Sea. In a slightly modified form this Boeing/Bundesmarine design would eventually become that of the NATO/USN PHM.
All major technical features of the ship design were derived from a proven technology base. As with the Italian P-420 Spaviero, the ship configuration had been established to incorporate an advanced combat system that was con- sistent with the significant advance in the area of the weapon platform repre- sented by the submerged-foil hydrofoil concept. As configured at that time the weapons suit included a 7 6 -mm 0T0 Melara gun, four Exocet anti-ship missile installations, the HSA WM-28/52 FCS,42 and two 20 mm guns.
The Boeing Model 928-70 was designed for the Bundesmarine for operation in the Baltic Sea on an all-weather basis, i.e., in significant wave heights of 3 meters. Speeds of 50 knots could be maintained without exceeding the continuous rating of the main turbine engine. The ship had a foil borne range well in excess of 400 nautical miles. The turning diameter while foilborne at continuous power was well below 500 meters, in heavy seas as well as in calm seas. The ride qualities of the ship in terms of hull accelerations in heavy seas were
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comparable to those of conventional ships of far greater displacement. Hull- borne, the Model 928-70 would provide the advantage of improving hullborne seakeeping by extending the struts.
Boeing emphasized that its capability to design and construct the Model 928-70 for the Bundesmarine was the result of over ten years experience in pioneering the development of submerged-foil hydrofoil ships. This experience encompassed all of the major hydrofoil programs of the U.S. Navy previously covered in Section 3 of this sub-chapter; the PCH-1 High Point, FRESH I, Plainview and Tucumcari, as well as the privately developed HTS and Little Squirt. The high performance design features of the Model 928-70 also permitted the application of the aircraft experience of Boeing in addition to the ship construction experience.
The specific design of the Model 928-70 hydrofoil ship involved a high-strength all-welded aluminum hull with foils and struts of corrosion resistant high strength steel. Foils and struts were configured to reduce to a minimum the motions of the ship that result from the disturbed surface of the sea and from the associated orbital motion of the water.
The turbine-powered water jet propulsion system utilized two dual-section centri fugal pumps which were to be derived directly from the Tucumcari design. Elec- trical power for the ship was to be supplied by a 115/200 volt 400 Hz system that yielded major savings in equipment weights, consistent with the high per- formance nature of the ship. Hydraulic power was to be provided by two identi- cal aircraft-type hydraulic systems with provisions for automatic transfer of
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OUTBOARD PROFILE
critical loads in the event of damage to one system. Foil borne control of the ship was to be accomplished by a full-time automatic control system that required no attention on the part of the crew once takeoff has been completed. This system provided attitude stabilization, automatic control of foil-depth, automatic banking in turn maneuvers, and automatic alleviation of seaway disturbances .
(2.) Development of the KKB-162 system specification under contract. In preparing its proposal for the development of the KKB-162 Weapon System, it had become clearly evident during November that the specifications governing the Weapon System were lacking. The German government was demanding full proof of performance. Consequently, Myers decided that it was necessary to backup and reach a complete contractual definition first, prior to proceeding with the developmental proposal.
With its Model 928-70 hydrofoil ship, Boeing had already completed five of the seven subspecs for the 230 ton KKB-162 ship system specification in the area of: hull structure; machinery (e.g. propulsion systems and power generation); the electric plant; auxi liar y systems (e.g. environmental control systems and fresh water system); and furnishings. However, Boeing lacked the data necessary to complete the coimuni cation and control systems subspec or to even begin to tackle the armament subspec.
In order to reach adequate contract definition for firm pricing and scheduling of the entire Weapon System it was essential that Boeing develop KKB-162 Weapon System specifications and baseline definition. MTG, with its background in
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The German Military Requirement
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preparation of similar data for the S-143 and the German Frigate Program, had the capability and was a logical choice as a partner for developing this data.
Consequently, in a December 4, 1970 letter to MTG's Fruendt, Gene Myers made MTG an offer. Myers proposed that the most expeditious way to prepare these specifications would be for MTG, to undertake as a prime contractor the job of Weapon System specification development. Boeing 'would provide technical assist ance to MTG to insure definition of an integrated system including the hydro- foil ship. Boeing's objective would be to develop a set of specifications acceptable to both BwB and Boeing and thereby facilitate contract definition and agreement. Boeing then would be ready to prepare a formal proposal for development of the Weapon System as a separate response to the specifications developed by this effort.
As a result of the proposal Boeing and MTG negotiated a technical assistance agreement^ over the following month that resulted in MTG's award to Boeing of a Cost plus fixed fee contract on January 11, 1971 for $133,805. The agreement covered 94 man-weeks of technical support over a 14 week period extending from January 11 and May 23, 1971. The work was to take place primarily in Hamburg at MTG. Merritt was on-site manager in Wilhelmshaven of the Boeing technical team, one fluctuating between three and five people over the first five months of 1971.
More or less simultaneously, MTG was awarded a 1 million DM ($250,000) study contract from the German MOD'S Procurement Agency, the Bundesamt fuer Wehr- technik and Beschaffung (BWB), to develop specifications for the new KKB-162
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hydrofoil design. The total effort eventually performed under the MTG-BWB contract came to 1,097,000 DM by the fall of 1970.
As previously pointed out, the KKB-162 specification was to evolve, after a
compromise with the USN later in 1971, into a slightly modified version which
became the NATQ/USN PHM design. In the words of Gene Myers:
Without the KKB-162 study, the background work would never have been done that allowed the PHM to go forward. The KKB-162 study forced the PHM in the direction that it finally took in size, speed, and range.44
Upon completion of the KKB-162 contract definition study Boeing began prepara- tion of its firm-fixed price proposal to the FRG for ten KKB-162 hydrofoil ships, the first to be launched 28 months after contract award. However, these efforts were abruptly terminated4- by a rapid succession of events, starting the same month with the Tucumcari's deployment to Europe which shifted the focus of the Bundesmarine away from a national solution and back to a NATO one. This European deployment proved to be the needed catalyst which finally lead to initial agreement on a larger NATO hydrofoil project.
e. The USN/Boeing PSH-2 Tucumcari is Deployed to Europe and the USN sponsors the Launching of the NATO Project
Technical discussions continued in parallel between Boeing and the Bundesmarine during January and March while the KKB-162 study was underway. March 1971 also saw another round of these discussions with the British Navy, and for the first time, the Danish Navy.
Per the CN0*s approval the previous year, the USN* s Tucumcari was shipped across the Atlantic from Norfolk, Virginia' on an 1ST for denonstrati ons in the FRG
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Chapter 10
and Denmark in April and May 1971. Boeing provided support for the deployment.
A special ad hoc meeting of NATO's SWG-6 was held aboard the Tucumcari during one of these demonstrations in Denmark. The PGrl-2 Tucumcari 1 s performance was impressive and succeeded in completing the process of locking the FRG in on the PHG-2 Tucumcari based design. Grumman representati on in Brussels during the NATO Project Group 6 deliberations ended shortly thereafter.
The Tucumcari demonstration at Olpenitz in the FRG made a good impression in spite of an engine failure and bow door failures. Not all of the VIP's invited made it even after the demonstrations were rescheduled three times, but those that did ride the PGH-2 were enthusiastic. A large number of MTG personnel, however, were able to ride Tucumcari because of these delays.^
Tucumcari demonstrations in the United Kingdom had fewer hitches with equipment problems and were generally very successful. Joint operations with the Vospers Tenacity fast patrol boat and. several air cushion vehicles showed that the fully submerged hydrofoil was vastly superior in speed, comfort, noise level and maneuverability.
As this was all going on, pressure began to build up for the FRG to release its KKB-I62 study. It was understood that if the FRG was really serious about influencing the U.S. in the "circular of requirements" for the NATO PHM program, those specs had to be available to the PG-6 Group by mi d -summer .^7
After the demonstrations in Northern Europe the Tucumcari continued down the Atlantic coast and traveled the length of the Mediterranean . Demonstrations
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were given in Greece, Turkey and Italy. Upon completion the Tucumcari returned to Italy where it was loaded back on the LST serving as its support ship, and headed for Norfolk, Virginia.
As a result of these demonstrations, the Bundesmarine' s commitment to the KKB-162 hydrofoil design based on a quadrupling of the Tucumcari, became rock solid. Representative of this milestone, the MTG originated KKB-162 designa- tion was replaced by a new designation provided by the Bundesmarine, $-162 ('S' for Schnell boot). 48
In June 1971, NATO PG-6 met in London and the British, Canadian, U.S. , German, and Italian navies began to move toward a concensus on a joint program based on the Tucumcari. It was at this meeting that the U.S. N. committed itself to building two PHM lead-ships if a design satisfactory to at least one other NATO Navy could be arrived at. The Bundesmarine offered no official response at the meeting, but U.S.N. personnel began to get the feeling from private conversations that they would soon join.
It was during this period that Boeing, having signed an agreement with France's Aerospatiale to produce under license the French surf ace-to-surf ace Exocet naval missile earlier in 1971 (if they could sell the U.S.N. on it), made a final attempt to get the French Navy interested in joining the hydrofoil project. The idea was to tie the Exocet in with the PHM as a 'quid pro quo'. As it was the French Navy never became seriously interested in the nascent NATO PHM program, nor did the U.S. Navy adopt the Exocet (a sea-skimmer missile)
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preferring to proceed with their own McDonnell Douglas Harpoon project, the missile that was later to equip the U.S. N. PHM's.^O
By June 1971 the USN had finally assumed the helm, taking over from the Bundes- marine and Italy as the principal sponsor of a T ucuncari based follow-on system . Though the USN had taken a leadership role in sponsoring NATO hydrofoil activi- ties, up to this point it had been wedded to a Grumman PGH-1 based design.
This was the case even though other elements in the Pentagon had prevailed in selecting the P(2H -2 Tucumcari (with its better record in the area of reli- ability) for the European demonstration.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Zumwalt, made his support official in August. The 0MB and GAO also became actively involved at this point, working to support this effort by making sure that the joint program went smoothly, especially with regards to stream- li ning the formal source selection process. Both organizations supported the idea of a NATO project as good for both NATO, and the U.S. image in particular. Worthy of note is that 0MB support came in the person of Dr. James Schlesinger, shortly to become Secretary of Defense. 50 DSARC I was completed in November, 1971.51 On November 24, 1971, Boeing was awarded a sole source contract for a feasibility design study by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, D.C., for $5.9 million.
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5. Boeing as Entrepreneur!' al Coordinator for the
NATO Naval Armament Group (NNAG)
In parallel with the NATO activities in Brussels, throughout 1970 and 1971 Boeing was discussing advanced hydrofoil designs with several NATO navies, each navy being presented technical data individually. The Boeing effort was two pronged. The American, British, German, Danish and French, navies were being approached by Seattle-based Boeing personnel. Al Smith and Joe Spontak worked with the U.S.N. , and Gene Myers and Dick Merritt handled Northern Europe. Myers and Merritt were assisted by General Hentz and Werner Mueller of Boeing's Bonn Office. Boeing was working with the Italian Navy through its Rome office, in the person of Chuck Slater, and its recently formed Italian affiliate, Alinavi (60% Boei ng- owned ), in the person of Publio Magini. Alinavi was already under contract to the Italian Navy to design and construct a modified version of the USN/Boei ng PGH-2 Tucumcari , the P-420 Spaviero.
During this period, Boeing actively managed the flow of data to the interested NATO navies. By the late spring of 1971 the German and Italian Navies had been locked in on Boeing designed follow-on ships to the Tucuncari . The two navies made it clear to the USN that if they were to participate in a joint NATO miliary hydrofoil project, it would be for an enlarged version of the Tucumcari. The USN came around shortly thereafter and definitively (if not belatedly) selected the PGH-2 over the PGH-1.52
The dynamics of the Special Working Group 6 and the subsequent Project Group 6 meetings of 1970 and 1971 are particularly interesting. First, there was a
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problem with regards to the importance of the agenda for each meeting. The US Navy had some difficulty with the importance attached to a strict adherence to the agenda by their European counterparts, and effectively working within it. While the USN reps had greater latitude and could work towards the fulfillment of policy objectives, the European representatives of the navies were highly instructed, all decisions having been made independently prior to the joint session and pre-recorded in considerable detai 1.53
In mid-1971, in an effort to up-grade the meetings and allow for more on-the- spot decision making, the USN began to send a Rear Adniral to the PG-6 meetings. The others followed suit, but this did not circunvent the agenda conflict.
The work and decision making for such meetings takes place elsewhere, in the national capitals. The Brussels meetings were necessary to formally exchange these national positions, and endorse any points of accord.
Secondly, the inter-Navy coordination work had to be accomplished early so as to allow time for its digestion prior to the next NNAG Special Working Group 6/Project Group 6 meeting. The USN tried to handle this task itself, but usually came in with too little, too late. With this in mind, Boeing in the person of Gene Myers, assigned the role of entrepreneur! al coordinator. Myers presented the supporting data and assisted in working out positions in detail in the Northern European national capitals on a one-to-one basis prior to each meeting. Though industrial representatives are not allowed to be present at the meetings of NATO's CNAD , its Main Armament Groups (of which the NNAG is one), or any of their sub-groupings, Myers presence in Brussels was critical. This was because the exchange of views and data between governments was handled
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more effectively outside of the official meetings, away from the minute takers This included social gatherings as well. A great deal of the Brussels work for the NATO PHM was accomplished in this less formal environment, and here an industrial rep such as Myers could participate effectively. 55
Thirdly, in the NATO SWG for Small Patrol Craft ( SWG-6) and later PG-6, each representati ve from the larger nations came in supporting their own national technical solutions, as one might expect. The British Navy supported two dif- ferent concepts as represented by the Vospors planing boat and the SRN Hover- craft, the French pushed their 200-ton Saphyre hydrofoil design, the Canadians had a deHaviland hydrofoil design, the Germans originally supported their own hydrofoil design, and later the Boeing Tucumcari based KKB-162, and the USN promoted its PGH-1 and PGH-2 hydrofoils (with a bias toward the former). Gradually as 1970 progressed, Boeing efforts in their respective capitals suceeded in weening the German and British Navies away from their national designs and over to Boeing's PSi-2-plus design. Even after this had occurred though, these two navies continued for some time to give official support to their national designs in the PG-6 meetings, while privately admitting, away from the minute takers, that an advanced hydrofoil based on the Tucuncari was the preferable option. Moreover, as previously mentioned, the German navy terminated their own hydro-foil studies in the surnner of 1970 and placed a six-month DM 1 million study contract with MTG and Boeing several months later The 8ri tish Navy, unf ortunately , never found the funds to follow-up their interest with anything more concrete. 55
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Among the most active navies in NATO's SWG-6, Exploratory Group 2, and PG-6, the Italians were the one exception to this rule of each Navy pushing its own national design. Having already opted uni laterally to go ahead with the con- struction of a derivative of the Tucumcari, the Spaviero, they supported Boeing designs for a follow-on ship based on the Tucumcari from the begining, even before the USN. Of particular importance was the role played by one of the Italian Navy's representatives at the SWG meetings, Publio Magini. Dr. Magini was working as a consultant to the Italian Ministry of Industry. He also happened to have been the President of the joint Boeing-Ital ian firm Alinavi at this time. Unlike the other major allied nations, for NATO working groups, Italy relies heavily on technical support contracted for from industry. This is somewhat of a grey area as such firms are often partially (as was Alinavi), or totally state-owned. As a matter of principle, the competing national contractors are excluded from NATO meetings; NATO being, of course, an inter- governmental body. Magini brought hydrofoil technical expertise to the Italian delegation, in addition to greatly facilitating communications among the U.S. and Italian Navies, and Boeing.
Magini ' s role in getting NATO to accept, first, hydrofoils, and secondly, the Boeing design formula was crucial. His position was ambiguous, being simultaneously Boeing's Corporate consult- ant in Italy, President of Alinavi and a consultant to the Italian Navy delegation. Because of his deep technical know- ledge of Boeing hydrofoils, he was able to sell not only the Italy delegation, but various other delegates on the Boeing approach. He was able to understand what the individual and national delegation positions really were, act as a catalyst in arranging key meetings and, acting within ethical limits, keep Boeing as informed as possible of what was really happening.
In short, Magini ' s contribution was invaluable. 5/
A fourth and final point interrelated with the above concerns the ever present US - European conflict with regards to the business-government relationship
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and competition policies. The European governments are inclined to work with a designated contractor, whereas the U.S. Government must keep competition in the picture for a more prolonged period during the early phases of the acqui- sition process. In the case of the NATO PHM project, although the Boeing-USN working relationship was a good one, it was evident that the USN felt much more constrained in dealing with a potential contractor, than their German or Italian. counterparts. Gene Myers found. that communication was often easier with the German and Italian navies than his own, 58
Consequently, Boeing ended up selling its own navy on the merits of: 1) a PQH- l/PGH-2 follow-on project; 2) the design ultimately selected and 3) one with Boeing as the contractor— through the median of the two allied navies. In this role of advocate, the Italian Navy played the predominant role up through the completion of the German Navy's KKB-162 study contract with Boeing in mid- 1971. During the second half of 1971 both Navies were about equally supportive, but during 1972, the German navy assumed the primary role in negotiating with the U.S. Navy over the ultimate design of the PHM. The Italian navy assumed a neutral posture during this period, remaining open to whatever mix of the other two navies design preferences eventually prevailed. 59
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6. The Concept Definition Study Contract Award (November 1971) and
the Lead-ship Construction Contract Award (February 1973)
With the agreement in mid-1971 by the British, Canadian, German, Italian and U.S. navies, upon the PGH-2 as the basis of a follow-on project, the repre- sentatives within NNAG Project Group 6 began to oversee the negotiating of the def initization of project management and funding arrangements amongst the engaged nations. After several PG-6 meetings in the various allied capitals during the surrener, the five engaged nations were able to take the next, step and sign letters of intent.
In October, Captain Jim Wilkins (USN) was designated to be the Patrol Hydro- foil Project Manager, and Gene Myers was selected to be the Boeing PHM Program Manager.
a. Concept Definition Study (Phase I)
The sole source study contract was awarded by the USN on November 24, 1971,60 for a matrix design study which was to be Phase I of the NATO project.
The United States agreed to commence unilaterally with the design feasibility studies necessary to establish a conmon baseline capable of meeting each of the engaged nations (since reduced to three) specific operational requirements. This did not involve a clean specification, but only a general statement of work covering the ranges between the USN position of a 140 to 170-ton propeller driven hydrofoil, and the German's 230-ton water- jet propelled hydrofoil design which had in the interim received the designation of S-162.
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The original USN position originated from in-house studies carried out by the Naval Ship R&D Center (NSRDC) , a USN laboratory located near Washington, D.C., in Carter Rock Maryland.
The German position rested on the KKS-162 study carried out under contract by MTG and Boeing in the first half of 1971. The U.S. Navy originally thought that the Bundesmarine might be satisfied with a ship in the neighborhood of 180 tons, but Von Knobloch made it clear to Boeing's Bonn representative, Mueller, in early July that the' FRG would join only if the U.S. agreed to the German requirements. The FRG was in a particularly good position to influence the outcome of this debate because of having the KKB-162 specification.
In July, 1971 a U.S.N. team visiting the FRG was presented with the results of the KKB-162 by the MOD'S Armament Division with Von Knoblock presiding, and was surprised at the detail and the overall work. The presentation tended to disprove a number of the USN's assumptions on their 170 ton boat. Assumptions for fuel consumption were particularly questionable. The Bundesmarine got the impression that the USN was still using inputs from a Grumman design. USN team was impressed and promised to send current data on the NATO boat design for comments by Division T. A meeting with U.S. Navy to provide these comments was agreed to for September. 61
The U.S. Navy ultimately swung over to a 230-ton water-jet propelled design by early the following year. Meanwhile, Boeing had been exploring under con- tract during 1972 all variables of the combination of the two designs. As the study progressed the U.S.N. agreed that the 170-ton design had several major
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failings: it seriously understated the weapon suit payload, the electronics required, and the range. Contributing to the compromise being one heavily weighted toward the German position, was the German KKB-162 study having been in much greater depth than that of the U.5.N. 's own in-house technical support consultant, the NSRDC.62
The Italian Navy remained neutral throughout this process as the other two navies attempted to reach a concensus. In spite of this position of neutral- ity, Italy did continue to express its concern that the system was evolving in a direction contrary to its concept of what was called for to fill its requirement in the Mediterranean environment. The Italian concept emphasized a small, highly maneuverable craft that could operate on a highly dispersed basis in an inland sea. The idea was a low-cost, disposable system with mini- mum complexity that could be utilized more as a pure weapon.
As the design began to stabilize on the larger ship originally envisioned by the Bundesmarine, the Italian Navy saw itself assuming a share of the ever greater technical risk and cost that went along with the increased sophistica- tion, tonnage, and crew size.
Using the results of the common NATO design baseline, the effects of applying the individual national variations were investigated parametrically by the contractor. Upon completion of these studies in February 1972, a family of designs which satisfied both the common and individual national require-ments were presented to the provisional NATO Project Steering Committee^ fQr use -jn selecting ship commonality characteristics for the NATO Standard PHM Baseline.
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Final studies in March 1972 established the feasibility of adapting the Standard FHM design to meet the requirements of each national variation.64
Project Engineering at Boeing spent most of the rest of 1972 investigating various iterations of the detailed design, and supporting a series of preliminary design reviews (PDRs). (At one point, mid-year, a smaller 140-ton design resurfaced and had to be dealt with once again.) Meanwhile the NATO Offset Plan Manager, Dick Merritt, explored various equipment options with the aim of introducing as much German and Italian content as feasible into the ship design, while NATO Weapon System Manager, A1 Smith, investigated national weapon system requirements and alternative systems available (e.g. , for the FCS, systems from the Dutch firm HSA, France's Thomson-CSF, and several Italian manufacturers.)
Phase 1 was completed in December 1972, culminating in a mutually agreed to NATO Standard PHM contract design and the United States variation design. During this phase, two significant documents, the Ship System Requirements and the Ship System Description, were prepared. Together, these documents provided the basis for establishing a contract design. The Ship System Requirements document, expanded from the original NATO Circular of Requirements, contained all the requirements the ship design had to satisfy. Additionally, it incor- porated the feasibility design baseline resulting from the February 1972 pro- visional Steering Committee meetings. The Ship System Description document contained the description of the design as it had evolved from the periodic design reviews. At the conclusion of the contract design phase in late 1972, all major equipment to be included in the Standard Ship design had been selected,
. all subsystem configurations confirmed, and procurement of long lead equipment
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undertaken. Earlier allocations of space, weight, power, costs, and risks had been verified and established. 65
b. The Hybrid Metric Design
Not only was the ultimate design heavily influenced by an allied navy, but this was to be the U.S.N.'s first experience with a ship based primarily on the metric system. The NATO PHM Ship Standard Design (i.e., that element of the design common to participating navies) utilized a hybrid metric system for weights and measures, i.e., metric except where selection of non-metric equip- ment already existing and proven in a similar application was dictated by con- siderations of cost, design tradeoffs, or balance of payments. In addition, per the MOU, the design took into account industrial, commercial, and Govern- mental material standards applicable in the Participating countries. Moreover, in the interests of economical construction and mutual logistic support, NATO Standardization Agreements (Stanags) were to be applied to the maximum extent feasible. For NATO PHM Ship Variation Designs (i.e., the national peculiar elements of the design) the system of weights and measures to be applied were to be those selected by the Participating Government(s) on whose behalf any such Design was ordered. 66
c. The NATO Project Management Organization Falls into Place
When the provisional NATO Patrol Hydrofoil Project Steering Committee (NPHPSC) first met in Washington, D.C., in January 1972, it began to oversee the work of formalizing the protocol between the three engaged NATO nations and their attempts to arrive at a common design.
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The second provisional NATO Steering Committee meeting took place in Seattle, Washington, at Boeing's Plant II, in February, at which time additional letters of intent (with caveats) were signed between the USN and its two allies, while work continued on the definitive MOU for lead-ship construction. The third meeting took place in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Bonn in April. All three of these meetings were of one week duration.
The provisional NATO Steering Committee 1 s three National representatives were Rear Admiral George Halverson for the USN (later replaced by Rear Admiral Bill Reed) Herr Forndran for the FRG (later replaced by Herr Otte) and Admiral Ruzzier for the Italian Navy .67
Sufficient progress had been made in stabilizing the requirement and agreement on funding that by the time of the second Steering Committee meeting, the pace of work picked up on the establishment of the provisional NATO Patrol Hydrof oi 1 Project Office (NPHPO) in Washington, O.C., at the Naval Sea Systems Comnand, in late February 1972. During early 1972 the German and Italian staffers made several visits of two to three weeks duration to the provisional NATO Project Office. The NATO SPO was fully manned and opened in April.
With the establishment of the NPHPO in April, Boeing began to work exclusively with the Project Office, instead of the three navies individually, though M^ers continued to maintain excellent lines of communications with the three national members of the provisional NATO Steering Committee. Captain Wilkins wore two hats: one as Ship Acquisition Program Manager (SHAPM) for Project Management Ships ( PMS)-391 , reporting up through NAVSHIPS to the Chief of Naval Materiel
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and then to the CNO; the other hat was that of NPHPO Manager reporting to the NATO Steering Committee.88
The NPHPO was primarily manned by Americans and followed a matrix organization (i.e. dependent on other elements of the Naval Sea Systems Command for specific administrative or technical support). As previously mentioned, the USN provided the Program Manager, Captain Jim Wilkins (replaced by Capt. Ed Molzan in November 1975) and one of three Deputy Program Managers, Commander Carl Duff (who also wore two hats). The Germans and Italians each provided a Deputy Program Manager, Sigfried Tympe69 ( FRG) and Capt. Marco Perlo (Italy). Mr. Tympe had a staff of two Germans and Capt. Marco Perlo, one Italian. Each also served as head of one functional area of responsibi 1 ity.70
Most meetings between the NATO Project Office and Boeing during 1972 took place in Seattle, but one or two occurred in Washington, D.C.
While all this activity was taking place, NNAG Project Group 6 continued to meet in Brussels and the national capitals as a vehicle for the three engaged nations to keep the observer nations informed; Canada, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, and the U.K. These meetings continued into the early fall of 1972 on an intermittent basis, but as none of the observers elected to join by the end of one year in this status. Project Group 6 was dissolved.
As attempts to reach an accord among the three engaged navies dragged on, the fourth Steering Committee meeting occurred in July and August 1972 in Seattle, being in almost constant session through the summer. In early fall the last
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PG— 6 meeting took place in Bonn. In November 1972 the MOU covering a joint lead-ship design and construction program was finally signed, one year after the USN had awarded the original feasibility study contract. The U.S. govern- ment's assumption of the initiative and concommitant risk in the interim finally paid off. In the opinion of the first Boeing Program Manager, Gene Myers, "If we had waited for the MOU before going forward with the matrix design study, the project probably would have never gotten off the ground. "71
The second phase was to provide the detailed design and construction of the two United States variant lead ships and the delivery of a complete production data package suitable for competitive procurement of ships by any of the partici pating nations.
d. Interim Solutions are Found for Staffing and Funding as Signature of the
MOU Slips into 1972: the Case of the FRG.
The official statement, given to NATO PG-6 back in October 1971, said the FRG would provide its share of funding for conducting feasibility and parametric studies in the eventuality that the MOU was ever to be signed by the FRG.
This only covered the period through February 15th, however. Signing of the MOU prior to that date would not have been feasible due to the lack of approval at higher levels. In the understanding of the German representative in October 1971, the first time they would obtain knowledge on the funds to be committed, would be in January or February 1972. The mandatory approval would then take several additional weeks.
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As things turned out though, when the new year rolled around agreement upon and signature of an MOU was still not in sight. At the PG-6 meeting in Brussels in mid-February 1972, the FRG representatives were asked to give a presenta- tion on the status of their on-going efforts to find intermediate solutions for staffing the Project office and funding the feasibility design study. 72
The FRG (as did Italy for that matter) still needed to know the technical solu- tion of the standard design, prior to its making a decision as to whether it would meet the Bundesmarine' s requirements or not. But it was also understood that a NATO PHM Project Office could be established only after signing of the MOU. As the signature of the MOU had continued to slip, it was recognized that an intermediate solution was necesssary to enable the FRG (and Italy) to participate directly in discussions and the decision making process between U.S. Navy and Boeing Company vis-a-vis establishing the "feasibility design baseline."
The FRG had assigned the following personnel to a delegation to perform this task in January, 1972: Herr Von Knobloch, MoD, as head of the delegation;
Herr Tympe, 8WB, deputy naval architecture; Herr Smago, BWB, deputy weapons and electronics; Herr Rossmann, general Office of the Navy; and Herr Burgmeister, MTG's, deputy manager. A comparable team also arrived in D.C. from Italy.
The duration of this first stay in Washington, D.C. was three weeks from January 19 to February 10.73
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During this first period' in which the German delegates were working at PMS 391 in Washington, D.C., they participated in discussions and decision-making, as well ad working out different papers as recommendations to be forwarded to higher levels within the German government for approval. In particular, they worked on the final organization of the PHM Project Office, including detailed job descriptions.74
In early 1972, in order to keep the international program moving, the FRG found that it was expected to provide an additional commitment to PG-6 on its funding intentions during the scheduled NATO meeting in Brussels of the week of February 14-18, covering the period from mid-February through the time the MQU was signed. This they gave but only through May (at which point yet another commitment was required) .
After the Brussels meeting of PG-6 the German delegation returned home. The last week of February was taken up by meetings involving:
(1) Review and approval of the technical side of the Project (or elabora- tion of reconmendations) using available data on the feasibility design baseline, and;
(2) Review and approval of financial aspects of the project (design stage only).
At the beginning of March the German delegation returned to Washington, D.C.
The second Interim period of work for the FRG delegation to PMS 391 lasted
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throughout the month of March. After the delegations returned to the FRG at the end of March, final agreement was reached on setting up the provisional NATO project office in April.
e. Lead-ship Construction (Phase II) Begins
Phase II of the NATO project began the following winter with the Naval Sea Systems Command's award of the Lead-ship construction contract to Boeing in February 1973.
This was not without a last minute hitch, however. Though Phase I (the matrix design and feasibility study) had resolved why the U.S. Navy had to go for a larger water jet propelled ship (and the 140 ton design had in the meantime resurfaced and been suppressed), the U.S. Navy and Boeing found themselves having to rejustify the decision to accept the 230-ton water- jet design at the last minute, prior to the conmencement of Phase II.
Later, in August 1973, Boeing received an RFQ from the Naval Sea Systems Command for its first national variant work. It was for design, supply, and integra- tion of the German PHM (S-162) Variant Ship Combat System. Though several million dollars of national variant work was later to be done under contract for the FRG over the life of the NATO project, no such effort was ever specifi- cally contracted for in the case of Italy. As such, for Italy, national variant weapon system specifications never got past the stage of container size and weight.
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f . Boeing Gets its Feet Wet with German Procurement Regulations
The August 1973 RFQ to Boeing for the German Variant Ship Combat System desig- nated AEG Tel ef unken as the German subcontractor . In accordance with the Navy's RFQ, Boeing and AEG jointly prepared a statanent of work for the Phase I (prelim- inary design) proposal preparation effort. Following Boeing's placement of a purchase order, AEG submitted a proposal in November for a little under DM 2 million.
Of interest is that, for the first time since the beginning of the KKB-162, PHM/S-162 effort Boeing had to work through German procurenent regulations.
In particular, the offer was quoted under Verordnung fuer Oeff entl i ches Preisrecht ( V OPR ) 30-53. The proposal used maximun cost price ( Sel bstkostener- statungspreis mit Hoechstbegrenzung), that can be considered to be similar to a cost plus percentage of cost type of contract which was, of course, illegal under ASPR, But in another sense it corresponds to an undef initi zed fixed price contract with a not to exceed price, be it one that is meant to stay in the undef initi zed status for a prolonged period of time.
Per the German regulations, all audits and rate verification were carried out by the BWB. Boeing received the BWB audit findings report on the proposal prior to their own cost analysis. After endorsement and transmittal by NAVSEA, BWB later determined all prices, rates, maximum allowable cost, as well as indirect cost and compliance with VOPR generally. After negotiation of the contract, early the following year, Boeing transmitted it via NAVSEA to BWB for approval of the interim and ceiling cost price.
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7. The NATO Standard PHM Ship Design and
National Equipment Variations
It was recognized during the early stages of the ship acquisition process that a single version of the PHM, for use by all nations, was not likely. However, in order to ensure that the design, development, production, operation, and support related economies flowing from standardization could be attained, it was planned that the individual national PHM’s should have similar basic char- acteristics. This objective was achieved by designing a standard PHM ship for multinational use, yet retaining sufficient design flexibility to allow for the individual variations of any country. 75
The variations were primarily equipment-oriented, particularly in the combat systems. Nations were to be able acquire the standard PHM carrying the particu- lar combat equipment compatible with their own national support systems.
The hull form and size and the major structural bulkheads and decks, foils and struts, waterjets, pumps, controls, and main propulsion machinery in the ships of each participating nation were to be identical, both in equipment and arrange ment. Additionally, the auxiliary equipment and arrangements, deckhouse, and personnel accommodations embodied a standard design. However, several varia- tions in the latter were available to suit individual country manning requirements.76
An important element of the matrix study involved the selection of major sub- systems; an exercise laden with political overtones, as national preferences
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and the need to balance work sharing as much as possible among the three national industries, played themselves out.
a. The Standard Tri-national Propulsion Systems
As stated above the main propulsion machinery is standard to all national vari- ants of the PHM. It also included major work shares for the industries of all three participating nations. The PHM propulsion plant consists of two independ- ent systems, separated from each other by watertight boundaries. The hull- borne system consists of two water jet pumps, each driven by a Mercedes-Benz (later MTU) 8V331TC80 di esel engine. The f oi Iborne system consists of a single waterjet pump driven through a power-splitting reduction gear by a General Electric LM 2500 gas turbine engine. An advantage of this arrange-ment is that the diesel provides economical, long-range cruising and close-in, slow- speed, twin engine maneuvering while the relatively lightweight gas turbine is immediately available for high-speed foil operation when required. Addition- ally, the redundancy of this arrangement enhances ship survivability in peace- time as well as wartime. The LM 2500 marine gas turbine is a 2-shaft, simple- cycle, high- efficiency engine, developed from the GE TF39 aircraft jet engine that powers the United States Air Force C-5A transport and McDonnell Douglas DC -10. Extensive modifications have made it suitable to the marine environ- ment, and it is being employed in several other major U.S. Navy ship classes.'7'7 The LM 2500 on the PHM is a derated variant of that used on the larger U.S. N. ships and approximately one third of the content is Italian built.
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b. The Standard Italian Gun
Whereas the U.S.N. was exploring the introduction of two foreign systems into its inventory on a large scale, the 0T0 Melara 76mm gun and the HSA fire control system (FCS), in parallel for both the planned 30 ship buy of PHM's, plus the FFG-7 frigates, the FRG was also looking at corrmonality considerations The German Navy, however already had both systems in its inventory. The 0T0 Melara 76mm dual purpose gun was first introducted in the late-1960's in the 20 S-148 fast patrol boats. The fire control system (FCS)on the S -148 was a Thomson-CSF Vega model. The 0T0 Melara gun was again adopted for the order of ten S -143 fast patrol boats several years later. The S -143 was designed and built by the AEG -Telefun ken and Luerssen team. For the S- 143 though, the HSA WM/277^ FCS was chosen. The S -143 also carries torpedoes and Exocet anti-ship missiles. The second batch of ten S- 143 A ' s that were later ordered in lieu of S-162's were slightly different in that they had metal instead of wooden hulls, only one 76 mm gun and greater anti-aircraft capabi lity .80
The Italian Navy had meanwhile also adopted the 0T0 Melara gun for its P-420 military hydrofoil, and several other surface combatants.
Not surpris ingl y, the Italian 0T0 Melara 76mm gun was the one eventually chosen in 1972 to be the standard primary gun for the PHM. It satisfied the require- ments of all participating national variations. It represents a significant advance in lightweight, reliable design and performance over previous gun systems available for hydrofoil application. Except for two ammunition loaders the gun is unmanned and automatically controlled by the fire control system, with the firing controls centralized at the weapons control console.
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The ship can be delivered with or without secondary guns. If specified, two MK20 Rh 202 20mm AA guns can be provided, one each port and starboard, adjacent to the fire cotrol antenna structure. In addition, spaces are also available for pyrotechnics, small arms, and small arms ammunition. 81
c. The National Variant Fire Control systems
The heart of the standard command, surveillance, and weapons control suit for both the German and U.S. variants is the WM-28 Radar and Weapon Control System developed by N.V. Hollandse Signallapparaten of the Netherlands (or its Americanized version, the MK 92). The WM/28 is a solid state system that offers one radar dish to do two jobs, both scanning and tracking. This fire control system embodies a combined fire control and search antenna system, mounted on a single stabilized platform and enclosed in a fibreglass radome. The system has a minimum surveillance range suitable for close range, precise navigation and a- maximum range compatible with the employment of the ship's weapon suit to its full capabil ity.82
Whether a common fire control system would have been established for all parti ci pating nations was never definitively determined. Other modern fire control systems can be installed such as the ARGO system, one of several considered by
Italy for adoption.
It was actually the WM/25 that had orignally been considered by the USN for the PHM and FFG-7 program's but with the WM/28' s appearance, the USN adopted the newer system. The HSA fire control system has evolved over the last two
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decades from the WM/2Q to: the WM/22 two of which were built under license by Speery for the USN and a derivative of which was built in Canada as the WM/26; the WM/25 which was originally considered for the PHM and interoperable with the NATO Seasparrow SAM system (and mated to it for the Dutch, Belgian and German Navies); and then finally the WM/28 which is now under construction in the U.S., and again by Sperry, as the MK 92 FCS.83
The essential features of the WM/28 system are a compact integrated design, resulting in minimum size and weight; extreme reliability, incorporating the latest solid state techniques and the use of integrated circuits and minatur- ized electronic components; simplicity in operation; and, most important, short reaction time. These systems are particularly designed for use against surface- to-surface missiles, air-to-surf ace missiles, aircraft, and surface targets of all types as well as for direct or indirect bombardment of land targets. The fire control antenna is normally controlled automatically by the digital computer, but it can also be operated manually to search for targets if desired. When radar range is not available, as for example, when engaging indirect shore targets, target settings can be applied to the system manually from information supplied by the ship's combat information center. This method can also be used for ship targets in an emergency. 84
Once a target has been acquired, missile and gun orders are automatically gener- ated by the general purpose digital computer. Firing is by manual controls located on the weapons control consoles.
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d. The National Variant Missile Systems
Since the participating nations indicated preference for their individual missile systems from the beginning, none has been designated or included in the Standard Ship. However, the flexibility of the PHM design permits the installation of a variety of surface-to-surface missile systems; including either: the USN/McDonnell Douglas Harpoon; the French Aerospatiale Exocat (chosen by the FRG) ; the Italian missiles, Otomat or Teseo; or any smaller missile system. Space has been provided on the fantail to accommodate missile launchers, port and starboard in parallel pairs, that are deck-fixed in eleva- tion and azimuth. The space and weight allocation satisfied each presently identified national requirement.^
All necessary equipment for guidance of the missile will be engineered in combi- nation with the WM28/MK 92 system. The missile checkout, firing, and guidance controls are centralized in the missile status and firing section of the weapons console. It is to be noted that neither launcher crew nor shipboard mainte- nance of missiles is required.
As the USN is the only nation to procure PHMs to date, the USN Harpoon is the only missile currently in use on PHMs. The Harpoon is designed to fly itself, homing in on radar beams that it bounces off the target ship. It flies low over the waves to make it hard to hit, gains altitude just prior to reaching the ship and drives a 500-pound warhead into the ship's vulnerable top decks.
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8. Negotiation of the Design and Development
Memorandum of Understanding
U.S. objectives in promoting allied participation in the PHM project were: reduce initial non-recurring costs to the U.S. involved in launching a project based heavily on U.S. technology and targeted for adoption by allied navies; obtain the downstream operational and economic advantages of standardization; and indulge in a little image building for NATO and the U.S. (very laudible aims). Now how does one get there given the numerous constraints?
First of all, in any such negotiation with potential partners, everyone is, at least initially, trying to get the most while giving the least. The thorniest problem to be faced during the MOU negotiations extending from mid 1971 to the fall of 1972 was basically over the conditions that would be attached to the release of the resultant technical data package (TOP).
Chief among these conditions would be work-sharing, i.e., the eventual arrange- ments that would be worked out for the subsequent production phase (as the developmental work sharing for this project would inevitably be unbalanced).
The basic dilemma was simply , how could the release of the TOP be tied to conditions in the first design and development MOU, which inevitably had to remain vague with regards to the eventual distribution of production, while awaiting the completion of lead-ship development and the negotiation of a second more precise production stage MOU. In short, how to gain and maintain voluntary participation through balancing cost and benefits among all of the participants over time while simultaneously managing a rational allocation of the available resources to fulfill a common military requirement. No small feat.
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Yet another ticklish aspect of the decision-making dynamics summarized above, centered on the U.S. Navy's having to oversee the completion of a feasibility/ matrix design study that reflected a concensus among a fluid set of partners, while avoiding seriously compromising the USN's ultimate determination of what it individually needed. Meanwhile, U.S. funds were being committed and spent covering the full cost of the design study {for eventual reimbursement if things went as planned). Naturally the U.S.N. could not accept a system that did not meet its requirements. As it turned out this didn't happen, though it could have been a serious problem.
Another dilemna faced by U.S. Navy negotiators was that, it would be necessary to separate the wheat from the chaff, i.e., identifying and negotiating with those among the 'interested' nations that were in the end likely to make firm com-mitments. Once a smaller grouping of engaged nations willing to make commit ments was established, it could proceed with substantive negotiations. But this had to be accomplished in a manner that would keep the interested nations in the picture as observers as long as possible to avoid closing anyone out prematurely when 'only a little more time and information was needed'. This in turn suggests yet another issue, how much data actually needed to be dissemi- nated in order to obtain and sustain this interest without compromising the interests of the originators of the data and the program's momentum. This naturally has to be accomplished with the full knowledge that most recipients primarily are interested in information gathering.
Yet another consideration involves the timeliness of decision making and commit- ments of each of the participating governments. The fumbling of any one of
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them can waste vital weeks or even months for the other participants who can do little more than sit on their hands.
One last point closely interrelated with the previous one involves the multiple actors and corresponding coordination activities and influences impacting the national negotiating teams. The U.S.N. team had to coordinate with other com- ponents within the DoD , especially the OASD/ISA, and with other Government departments including the Treasury Department; and then there were the natural, low-level blue-suiter pressures associated with international navy-to-navy comraderi e and the small close-knit hydrof oiler club which included the U.S. contractor. There were also those usual differences between the allied navies vis-a-vis government- con tract or relations, involving, for example, the passing on of information on the status of government- to- government negotiations, repre- senting the interests of their own industries, and attendance at contractor hosted social gatherings.
After the completion of the Tucumcari demonstration in Northern Europe the prospects for a joint project rapidly improved. One month later, in June the U.S. negotiating team was formed at the ins istance of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The office of the CNO was responsible for all nego- tiations with allied navies. For the PHM project the task fell to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare (OP -37), Admiral Halverson. OP-37 provided overall policy guidance through the heading up of U.S. representati on to the NATO Project Group 6 and later to the Project Steering Committee.
Limiting its role to one of providing sponsorship and direction, OP-37 received support at the working level in technical and acquisition matters from NAVSHIPS (later consolidated with NAVORD (ordnance) into NAVSEA).
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The NAVSHIPS Deputy Counsel for Procurement at the time was Mr. Peniel Moed, who was brought in to provide legal support. Though nothing formal, as nego- tiations progressed Mr. Moed's role gradually expanded from a procurement support function to one of spokesman for U.S. positions in negotiating the MOU. Later, once the MOU was signed, Mr. Moed continued to serve as (among other responsibilities) Counsel to the Project Office up through December 1976. Prior to leaving NAVSEA in 1976 Mr. Moed spent three additional years (early 1973 to early 1976) negotiating the never to be signed PHM Production Stage Supplement to the MOU.
The first Project Group 6 meeting dealing with the prospective MOU for a joint design study was held in London in June 14-16, 1971. The U.S.N immediately assumed the lead in drafting the MOU. Following this meeting, Mr. Moed produced the first of six draft agreements (the last of which was ultimately signed in November 1972, thus becoming the MOU). All PG-6 countries intending to parti- cipate had to submit written comments on the U.S. draft by July 15. After this, the next milestone was August 2, when a one page letter of intent was due from each country intending to commit resources. Following subsequent meetings of PG-6, and then the project Steering Committee after January 1972,
Mr. Moed would re-draft the MOU, then circulate it within NAVSEA and OP -37, and finally to the allied teams participating. Wording was generally not nego- tiated at the table due to language problems. The negotiations tended to be conceptual .
The U.S. Navy team used the NATO Seasparrow developmental stage MOU as the principal model for the NATO PHM project. The carry-over from NATO Seasparrow
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was especially noticeable in the areas of the ultimate MOU dealing with patents and technical data. But one could only go so far on this basis, since many areas of the provisions were uniquely the product of the NATO Seasparrow nego- tiations and were inapplicable to NATO PHM»
Through the summer of 1971 and into the fall, most nations on PG-6 gradually dropped away as the U.S., the FRG and Italy reached a concensus on the basis upon which a joint project would be launched. Letters of intent were signed shortly thereafter. First the Portugese and Turks dropped out, joining the French and Dutch in the status of observers, then the Canadians, Norwegians,
Danish and finally the British became observers. The last Navy to go in late 1971, the British, presented a particular challenge. It became increasingly doubtful that they would aver be able to come up with the money to join, their interest in the fine points of language and other details of the negotiations continued. The intensity was there, but not the money. Detailed and binding negotiations must be avoided until the serious players are on board.
Gene Myers, Boeing PHM Program Manager (November 1971 to August 1973), observing these negotiations from the sidelines, felt strongly that, among all the observer nations, it was the Danish Navy that had the most earnest interest in the project, and came the closest to being the fourth participant.
As previously mentioned, the most difficult issue througout the negotiations concerned the technical data package (TDP) and the conditions attached to its eventual utilization by the Italians and Germans. There was a concern on the part of the U.S. Navy that Italy might ultimately be forced to pull out without
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ever building ships for its own use, after it had received the TOP. There was a need to make a clear linkage between construction for a nation's own use, i.e., for NATO purposes first, and then later maybe develop foreign sales as an ancillary effort to help amortize non-recurring costs associated with the set up of the specifically NATO production effort.
Including prior efforts in the area of hydrofoils, the U.S.N. was providing 100% of the original system unique technology^ while initially offering to split the non-recurring costs of this project on an equal basis, i.e. 1/3 for each nation. For the two European participants, the TDP for an extremely unique and advanced system was to be made available on a royalty free-basis (at least as far as their own ships were concerned) in return for a limited investment. In order to attain U.S. Government objectives for the project, i.e., procurement and deployment of the ships by as many NATO Navies as